The Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is currently taking place at the Congress Center of Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Nearly 150 country representatives are participating in the week-long assembly and associated meetings. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton
By Stella Paul
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, May 31 2026 (IPS)
The 71st Council meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) opened today amid a sharp divide, with donor nations urging broader and increased funding commitments, while developing countries called for more equitable and accessible pathways to environmental finance.
In April, donor countries pledged an initial USD 3.9 billion to the GEF Trust Fund’s ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), which will support environmental projects worldwide from 2026 to 2030.
Today, government officials, development banks, philanthropies, and civil society groups welcomed the pledges and highlighted GEF’s “whole of the societies” approach, which aims to involve governments, communities, businesses, and civil society. However, discussions at the meeting preceding the Assembly also reflected a growing challenge: environmental problems are becoming more urgent just as international aid budgets are shrinking.
Developing countries repeatedly raised concerns about whether funding is reaching those who need it most and whether access to it is fair.
Aziz Abdukhakimov, Advisor to the President of Uzbekistan on Environment and Chairman of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, addresses the opening day of the 71st GEF Council meeting. Credit: IISD/ENB/Danny Skilton
Opening the Assembly, GEF Interim Chief Executive Officer Claude Gascon said GEF-9 is designed to “unlock great investments” through stronger cooperation across government agencies while continuing support for least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).
“The resources must reach countries more efficiently, where the impacts are greatest,” Gascon said. He pointed to reforms agreed during replenishment talks that aim to simplify procedures and improve accountability.
According to the GEF Secretariat, its current projects are already delivering large-scale environmental benefits. GEF’s blended finance operations have achieved an average co-financing ratio of 18 to 1, meaning every dollar invested by GEF has helped attract many more dollars from public and private sources for biodiversity, climate, land restoration, and pollution projects.
Aziz Abdukhakimov, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Environment and Chairman of the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change, highlighted the importance of this forum.
“We meet in Samarkand at a moment when the triple planetary crisis is becoming increasingly visible across all regions of the world. At the same time, the window for achieving our global environmental commitments is rapidly decreasing. This is why the role of the GEF is important more than ever,” Abdukhakimov said.
The Opening Council of the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is in Progress at the Congress Center of Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
A More Inclusive GEF
A key feature of GEF-9 will be integrated programming, based on the idea that environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and land degradation are interconnected and should be tackled together.
Ninety-eight countries, including 31 least developed countries and 26 small island states, are expected to participate in these programs from 2026 to 2030.
More than 100 country-level workshops and consultations have already been held to help countries strengthen their capacity, align GEF funding with national priorities, and increase participation by women, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and the private sector.
Donor countries highlighted what they see as progress. Norway welcomed larger allocations for LDCs and SIDS, as well as funding targets aimed at directing more resources to countries with the greatest needs. Norwegian representatives said they have high expectations for the results GEF-9 will achieve.
Representatives of Indigenous Peoples also described the replenishment process as a major step forward.
Speaking on behalf of the GEF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group (IPAG), Giovanni B. Reyes said Indigenous communities had a stronger voice in shaping the new funding cycle.
“For the first time, we were at the table of the replenishment. For the first time, our work will be visible in the way it deserves,” Reyes told the Assembly.
“The inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and our territories in the corporate scorecard means our contributions will be counted, our lands recognised, and our results disaggregated alongside women and youth. We have always been there — this is our way of life. Now the data will tell our story and amplify our voices.”
The representative said that commitments to create a dedicated GEF Indigenous Peoples policy, establish procedures for Indigenous-led projects, and allow Indigenous organisations to become accredited implementing agencies represent lasting institutional changes – rather than one-time promises. The representative also warned that failing to protect Indigenous and traditional territories would lead to biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse.
New Partnerships Announced
Several new partnerships were announced during the opening ceremony.
Gascon revealed a partnership with a U.S.-based philanthropy to support biodiversity conservation in Africa through the Africa Protected Areas Initiative.
A video presentation highlighted protected areas such as Kafue National Park and North Luangwa in Zambia, showing how relatively small protected areas can help secure water supplies, support local livelihoods, and conserve globally important wildlife.
Rob Walton of the Blue Nature Alliance described GEF as a key institution in global environmental finance. He highlighted its support for international environmental agreements, including preparations for the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty, which he called an important milestone for ocean protection.
The World Bank, which serves as trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, announced that USD 3.3 billion has already been confirmed for GEF-9.
Speaking at the Assembly, Maitreyi Das, World Bank Vice Director of Trust Funds and Partner Relations, said additional contributions are expected as donor approval processes continue. For the first time, countries can make pledges throughout the replenishment period rather than only at the beginning.
“This replenishment reflects a shared resolve to advance an ambitious environmental agenda at a very difficult moment for overseas development assistance,” she said. She credited cooperation among donors, recipient countries, civil society, businesses, and international environmental conventions.
Developing Countries Seek Fairer Access
Despite the positive announcements, delegates from developing countries said access to finance remains a major problem.
African representatives described GEF-9 as an important opportunity to address drought, food insecurity, land degradation, and biodiversity loss. However, they warned that available funding remains far below what Africa needs to meet global climate and biodiversity goals by 2030.
While they welcomed increased attention to least developed countries, drylands, and integrated programmes, several African countries cautioned that blended finance and private-sector investment require financial systems and risk-sharing mechanisms that many countries still lack.
“The region therefore calls for stronger grant-based financing, simplified access procedures, and capacity support to ensure equitable participation,” said Baixo Eduardo of Mozambique, who is representing southern African countries at the assembly.
Small island states voiced similar concerns.
Speaking for Caribbean countries, one representative said predictable, adequate, and accessible funding remains essential if SIDS are to achieve environmental and sustainable development goals.
“The ambition of GEF 9 is encouraging,” she said, particularly in biodiversity conservation, climate resilience, and pollution reduction. “But implementation mechanisms must reflect the unique vulnerabilities and capacities of small island developing states.”
Brazilian delegate Simone Carolina Bauch, speaking on behalf of its constituency, welcomed commitments to dedicate 35 percent of GEF-9 funding to biodiversity and 20 percent to Indigenous Peoples and local communities. However, she said that countries should remain in control of how projects are designed and implemented.
Bauch also called for greater clarity on the rules for participating in integrated programmes and warned that co-financing requirements should not become barriers to accessing funds.
Yicheng Yao, representative of China and Hrisheekesh Arvind Modak, representative of India, strongly supported these concerns raised by Bauch and called for simpler and fairer access to green finance.
Responding to these issues, Gascon said resources have been set aside for a country engagement strategy that will help national focal points better understand funding opportunities and make informed decisions.
He added that further guidance on participation in integrated programmes will be presented to the GEF Council later this year, with formal expressions of interest expected in early 2027.
As discussions continue in Samarkand, the GEF said the window for new contributions to the GEF-9 replenishment will remain open throughout the Assembly, allowing countries to make additional pledges for the 2026–2030 funding cycle. Delegates also thanked the government of Uzbekistan for hosting the assembly.
Notes: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
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Drawing on interviews with Zambian officials, bureaucrats, and both Chinese and Zambian professionals in the digital sector, this policy brief examines how Zambian actors have engaged with Chinese-financed digital projects across two administrations: the Patriotic Front (PF) government under Edgar Lungu (2015–2021) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) government under Hakainde Hichilema (2021–present). It argues that the transition from the PF to the UPND widened bureaucratic room for manoeuvre in managing Chinese digital projects, yet these gains remained limited and sometimes fragile, as they were partly offset by personnel reshuffling and relatively weak institutional continuity.
Drawing on interviews with Zambian officials, bureaucrats, and both Chinese and Zambian professionals in the digital sector, this policy brief examines how Zambian actors have engaged with Chinese-financed digital projects across two administrations: the Patriotic Front (PF) government under Edgar Lungu (2015–2021) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) government under Hakainde Hichilema (2021–present). It argues that the transition from the PF to the UPND widened bureaucratic room for manoeuvre in managing Chinese digital projects, yet these gains remained limited and sometimes fragile, as they were partly offset by personnel reshuffling and relatively weak institutional continuity.
Drawing on interviews with Zambian officials, bureaucrats, and both Chinese and Zambian professionals in the digital sector, this policy brief examines how Zambian actors have engaged with Chinese-financed digital projects across two administrations: the Patriotic Front (PF) government under Edgar Lungu (2015–2021) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) government under Hakainde Hichilema (2021–present). It argues that the transition from the PF to the UPND widened bureaucratic room for manoeuvre in managing Chinese digital projects, yet these gains remained limited and sometimes fragile, as they were partly offset by personnel reshuffling and relatively weak institutional continuity.
The 2026 US–Israel–Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have triggered one of the largest oil supply disruptions in modern history. Brent crude prices rose sharply, producing a major external shock for oil-importing developing economies at a moment when the international development system was already under severe strain. Petrochemical products shipped through the strait are also vital for agriculture, medicine and industry. The largest contraction on record of official development assistance (ODA) had already been recorded in 2025, while geopolitical tensions and rising defence expenditures are reshaping ODA spending priorities and development policy directions.
This brief examines how the oil shock will impact development cooperation. The significance of the oil shock lies not only in the price increase itself but also in its timing, and it arrives amid an ongoing reconfiguration of development cooperation. The analysis is organised around two postulates that underpin the post–Cold War development architecture. The first is the existence of states in the Global South with sufficient authority and developmental aspirations and capacity to pursue broad-based development goals. The second is the existence of donor countries willing and able to support those states’ aspirations.
The oil shock weakens both postulates through different mechanisms. For many oil-importing developing countries, rising fuel, food and transport costs intensify fiscal stress, debt vulnerabilities and pressures on state capacity. Fragile states without strategic importance are especially exposed. At the same time, donor countries face mounting pressures
from fiscal tightening, defence spending, domestic cost-of-living politics and growing scepticism towards multilateralism. These dynamics risk reinforcing one another in the sense that weakening state capacity can intensify instability, while rising instability may further reduce political support for development co-operation in donor countries.
The brief argues that alternative financing sources such as Gulf finance, South–South cooperation and climate finance are unlikely to compensate for the scale of OECD donors’ retrenchment. The likely result is a more fragmented, transactional and geographically selective development cooperation system, in which the countries most in need are increasingly among the least likely to receive sustained support unless they hold geopolitical importance.
Three policy implications follow from the war. First, the multilateral development financing architecture requires urgent bolstering. Instruments such as the World Bank’s International Development Association and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust face growing pressure precisely as low-income countries (LICs) confront simultaneous food, fuel, debt and financing shocks. Second, the increasing concentration of concessional finance to strategically prioritised states should not be treated as inevitable. Fragile states risk declining concessional finance and multilateral reach despite acute humanitarian need. Third, European donors must decide whether development cooperation remains anchored in poverty reduction or becomes subordinated to defence, migration and geopolitical priorities.
Professor Andy Sumner is a professor of International Development at King’s College London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
As Gaza’s fragile ceasefire frays and humanitarian conditions deteriorate, a senior UN envoy warned the Security Council last week that delays in implementing the Council-backed transition plan for the enclave will only increase suffering and undermine recovery. Credit: UN News
By James E. Jennings
ATLANTA, USA, May 29 2026 (IPS)
If you have been paying attention to the ongoing wars in Ukraine, Iran, Lebanon, and many other places, perhaps you have noticed that battles today are far different from those of the last century. Now it’s not only tanks and planes but also scores of long-range missiles and massive flights of drones linked to cybernetic warfare.
The tragedy of military and civilian deaths continues, however, with the number of casualties among Russian soldiers in Ukraine reportedly reaching an astonishing 25,000 every month. As always in warfare, civilians are unfairly targeted and suffer the most, with senseless random missile and drone attacks killing innocent people on both sides with regularity.
Professed lovers of peace, like US President Trump and Israel’s Mr. Netanyahu, both of whom have agreed to brokered ceasefire agreements in Gaza and in Lebanon, continue to bomb the other side with impunity. For the most part they are getting away with it, without protests from anybody except a few ineffective agencies and lonely voices.
That is indeed a new, inventive way of war: the combatants agree to a ceasefire, and then one side keeps bombing but insists that the other stop because of the agreed ceasefire. Under such circumstances, all a ceasefire really means is “Your side must stop firing—but we’ll fire at will.”
Such nonsense is a game of meaningless words with no resolution in sight. The increasingly Nazified Likud Party in Israel continues to bomb cities, villages, and individual homes and apartment buildings in Lebanon as if it were licensed to do so, with little effective pushback from the world community.
That is perhaps to be expected since the world has largely stood by silently for almost four years during the certifiable genocide in Gaza. And by now more than 1.2 million people have been driven out of their homes in South Lebanon into a life of desperation and uncertainty.
The efficient US-backed Israeli killing machine in Lebanon has continued to smash residential buildings with impunity and pile up an obscene list of civilians murdered—innocent mothers, fathers, grandparents, and many children.
In Gaza, Palestinian sources have recorded more than 2,000 Israeli violations of the so-called “ceasefire” between October 2025 and March 2026, with a total of over 700 Palestinians killed.
Only a temporary hold from the United States has kept Israel from continuing to bomb Iran. Israel refuses to listen to any restrictions on bombing Lebanon even though there is supposedly a ceasefire in effect.
Deaths there since the short April 17 “ceasefire” continue to escalate day by day. In Iran, both Israel and the US have promised to keep obliterating what was long ago announced as already obliterated.
The number of Iranians killed and wounded in the first three months of the joint US-Israeli aggression has been announced by the Tehran government as in the tens of thousands, and the war is not over yet. Most memorable is the massacre of 120 schoolchildren, mainly girls, on the first day of US bombing at Minab, Iran. Casualties so far on the US side number 13 killed and several dozens wounded. That’s the definition of one-sided warfare.
Modern wars may puzzle observers, but the art of twisting words and phrases and their associated meanings is as old as time. Lying, obfuscation, and obscene claims are the essence of war’s primary weapon, deception. Words can kill and do. “Ceasefire” is the latest lie. For Israel and the US, it means “You cease—we fire.”
James E. Jennings is the Founder and President of the aid agency Conscience International www.conscienceinternational.org and a longtime Middle East Peace Advocate.
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Voting by secret ballot. Credit: United Nations
By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, May 29 2026 (IPS)
The year 2026 seems to be an eventful year at the United Nations –a new President of the General Assembly (PGA), who will officially preside over the 81st session in mid-September, plus the election and appointment of a new Secretary-General (SG) who will takeover in January 2027 after the conclusion of a 10-year tenure by the outgoing SG Antonio Guterres.
When UN member states competed in elections– or sought votes for membership in the Security Council or in various UN bodies– the voting in the 1960s and 70s was largely tainted by cheque-book diplomacy — while promises of increased aid to the world’s poorer nations came mostly with heavy strings attached.
In the 1950s and 60s, voting was by a show of hands, particularly in committee rooms. But in later years, a more sophisticated electronic board, high up in the General Assembly Hall, tallied the votes or in the case of elections to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice, the voting was by secret ballot.
In one of the hard-fought elections many moons ago, there were rumors that an oil-soaked Middle Eastern country was doling out high-end, Swiss-made wrist watches and also stocks in the former Arabian-American Oil Company, then one of the world’s largest oil companies, to UN diplomats as a trade-off for their votes.
So, when hands, both from right-handed and left-handed delegates, went up at voting time in the Committee room, the largest number of hands raised in favor of the oil-blessed candidate sported Swiss watches.
As anecdotes go, it symbolized the corruption that once prevailed in voting in inter-governmental organizations, including the United Nations — perhaps much like most national elections the world over.
Just ahead of a crucial election, one Western European country offered free Mediterranean luxury cruises in return for votes while another country dished out — openly in the General Assembly hall— boxes of gift-wrapped expensive Swiss chocolates.
Fathulla Jameel, a former UN Ambassador and later Foreign Minister of the Maldives told Inter Press Service of how his resource-poor island nation, categorized by the UN as a Small Island Developing State (SID), would appeal to richer nations to help fund some of country’s infrastructure projects.
At least one rich Asian country, a traditional donor, was the first to respond – and magnanimously too, he said. The project would be fully funded —free, gratis and for nothing. But there was a catch: “If there is a vote at the UN, and it is not of any national interest to your country”, said the donor country’s foreign ministry, “we would like to get your vote.”
Perhaps for life – the life of the island nation itself which was threatened with sea-level rise and in danger of being wiped off the face of the earth. The offer was a clever political payback. Development aid with no visible strings attached.
There was at least one instance when the president of the General Assembly, the highest policy making body at the United Nations, was elected, on the luck of a draw -– following a dead heat.
With the Asian group failing to field a single candidate, the politically-memorable battle took place ahead of the 36th session of the General Assembly back in 1981 when three Asian candidates contested the presidency: Ismat Kittani of Iraq, Tommy Koh of Singapore and Kwaja Mohammed Kaiser of Bangladesh (described as the “battle of three Ks”—Kittani, Koh and Kaiser).
On the first ballot, Kittani got 64 votes; Kaiser, 46; and Koh, 40. Still, Kittani was short of a required majority — of the total number of members voting. On a second ballot, Kittani and Kaiser tied with 73 votes each (with 146 members present, and voting).
In order to break the tie, the outgoing General Assembly President drew lots, as specified in Article 21 relating to the procedures in the election of the president (and as recorded in the Repertory of Practice of the General Assembly).
And the luck of the draw, based purely on chance, favored Kittani, in that unprecedented General Assembly election. But according to a joke circulating at that time, it was rumored that the winner was decided by the flip of a coin — but the tossed coin apparently had two heads and no tail.
In more recent years, however, the regional groups, including the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean and the Western and Other Groups (WEOG) have called for a virtual ceasefire as they took turns according to geographical rotation. The Groups would name their candidates who get elected without any opposition.
But the seriousness of the UN’s far-reaching mandate has been tempered by occasional moments of levity which have rocked the Glass House by the East River— with laughter. The UN is a rich source of anecdotes—both real and apocryphal– in which the General Assembly (UNGA), takes center stage, along with the Security Council (UNSC) as a political sidekick.
When UN ambassadors and delegates congregate in the cavernous General Assembly hall at voting time, they have one of three options: either vote for, against, or abstain.
The most intriguing, however, is a fourth option: to be suddenly struck with an urge to rush to the toilet. The frantic attempt to leave your seat vacant — and consequently be counted as “absent”– takes place whenever the issue is politically-sensitive.
When delegates are unable to vote with their conscience– don’t want to incur the wrath of mostly Western aid donors or are taken unawares with no specific instructions from their capitals– they flee their seats and head for the toilet
At a lunch for reporters in his town house bordering Park Avenue in Manhattan, (“this was once owned by Gucci, now it is Fulci”), Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, an Italian envoy with a sharp sense of humor, described the fourth option as the “toilet factor” in UN voting.
And he jokingly suggested that the only way to resolve the problem is to install portable toilets in the back of the General Assembly hall so that delegates can still cast their votes while contemplating on their toilet seats. But for obvious reasons, there were no takers.
In most instances, the various regional groups and coalitions—including the Group of 77, the Latin American and Caribbean States, the African Union (AU) and the Western European and Others (WEOG)— take decisions behind closed doors ahead of voting and voted by consensus,
In the 1970s and 80s, the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961, was one of the largest and most powerful political coalitions at the UN led by countries such as Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Zambia, Cuba and Sri Lanka.
As a general rule, all 116 countries vote in unison on General Assembly resolutions rarely breaking ranks. A Sri Lankan ambassador once recounted a message transmitted from his Foreign Ministry in Colombo – primarily directed at newly-arrived delegates which read— “If you are faced with an unscheduled surprise vote, and do not have any instructions from the Foreign Ministry, look to the right to see how Yugoslavia is voting and look to the left to see how India is voting. If both ambassadors are seen bolting from their seats, just follow them to the toilet”.
This article contains excerpts from a book on the United Nations titled “No Comment – and Don’t Quote Me on That” authored by Thalif Deen, Senior Editor at Inter Press Service news agency. A former member of the Sri Lanka delegation to the General Assembly sessions, he is a Fulbright scholar with a Master’s Degree in Journalism from Columbia University, New York, and twice (2012-2013) shared the gold medal for excellence in UN reporting awarded annually by the UN Correspondents Association (UNCA). The book is available on Amazon. The link to Amazon via the author’s website follows: https://www.rodericgrigson.com/no-comment-by-thalif-deen/
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L'intégration européenne semble en panne, et l'administration Trump met au défi les politiques de l'Union dans les Balkans comme en Ukraine. Acteur majeur de l'élargissement, Pierre Mirel revient sur deux décennies de tâtonnements et d'avancées, avec la conviction que ce processus a plus de sens que jamais. Entretien.
- Articles / Questions européennes, Elargissement UE, Courrier des Balkans, Albanie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Bulgarie, Croatie, Kosovo, Turquie, Macédoine du Nord, Serbie, Slovénie, Monténégro, Ukraine, Blocage UEFinancial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.
Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.
Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.
The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.