Határon túli magyar portálok összesített hírei

A Panyi Szabolcs, a VSquare újságírója által közzétett, 2020-ból származó lehallgatott telefonbeszélgetés egyik fontos része, amelyben a magyar diplomácia vezetője arra kéri orosz kollégáját, segítsen abban, hogy az Andrej Danko vezette SNS átlépje az ötszázalékos parlamenti küszöböt a szlovák választáson, írta a Népszava.

Le moment choisi pour sa menace initiale laissait entendre que l'échéance était fixée à 23 h 44 GMT lundi

The post Trump suspend sa menace de « réduire en cendres » les centrales électriques iraniennes dans l’attente de nouvelles négociations appeared first on Euractiv FR.

The Baltic Sea and the North Sea face severe ecological challenges including historic pollution from wars, nutrient input as well as pressures from offshore energy, shipping, and fishing, leaving marine ecosystems highly degraded. Marine industrial expansion furthermore undermines conservation goals. Against this backdrop, more inclusive governance is increasingly gaining attention. Public and stakeholder participation, along with stronger science-policy interfaces, may offer innovative solutions, though outcomes vary widely across political, socio-economic and cultural contexts. This collection of seven empirical studies from various social science disciplines explores how participation, communication, and multi-level institutional frameworks shape existing marine governance towards the protection of marine biodiversity and sustainable ocean uses – and what are major challenges including the proliferation of intensified user conflicts.

Le pari des élections anticipées semble sur le point de porter ses fruits, malgré le recul de la popularité des sociaux-démocrates de la Première ministre danoise

The post Frederiksen en passe d’obtenir un troisième mandat alors que le Danemark se rend aux urnes appeared first on Euractiv FR.

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Les autorités chypriotes devraient intensifier leurs campagnes de promotion au cours des prochains mois afin de limiter les pertes financières

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Halálos kimenetelű közlekedési baleset történt hétfőn (3. 23.) délelőtt a D1-es autópályán, ahol egy Pozsony felől Nagyszombat irányába tartó Škoda személygépkocsi ismeretlen okból nekiütközött egy, az út szélén leállított kamion hátuljának. A Škodát vezető férfi a helyszínen életét vesztette (†44) – közölte a Nagyszombati Kerületi Rendőrkapitányság a Facebookon.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

L'ONU lance un nouvel avertissement climatique alors qu'El Niño se profile.

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Cette année, les cinq pays en tête du classement présentent chacun des aspects uniques qui contribuent à leur bonheur, même si la liberté de faire des choix de vie occupe une place prépondérante chez tous.

TASR: Személyi sérülés okozása miatt indított büntetőeljárást a belügyminisztérium Ellenőrzési Szolgálati Hivatala (ÚIS) egy vasárnap (3. 22.), Nagyszombatban történt közlekedési baleset miatt, mely során rendőrautó ütközött személyautóval – erősítette meg a TASR-nek a kerületi rendőrség és a belső ellenőrzés is.

A komáromi Rotary Club márciusi klubülésére egy igazán érdekes vendéget hívtak, méghozzá Sereghy Zoltán lovas kaszkadőrt, aki az utóbbi évek legismertebb filmjeiben tűnt fel. Láthatta őt a közönség a Herkulesben, a Vajákban, a Borgiákban, vagy legutóbb a Hunyadi című sorozat csatajeleneteiben. Utóbbiban hol magyar vitézként, hol oszmán harcosként vágtatott át a képernyőn.

2026. 3. 23. Az SaS párt sajtótájékoztatója

Már két oda-vissza repülőjáratot üzemeltet naponta a Wizz Air Pozsony és Kassa között, a szerda kivételével, a számuk így heti 9-ről 13-ra emelkedett – tájékoztatott a hétvégén Veronika Demovičová, a pozsonyi M. R. Štefánik repülőtér szóvivője.

The reported disappearance of Raphael Tuju has led to claims he may have been abducted.

By CIVICUS
Mar 23 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses Nepal’s upcoming election with youth activist Anusha Khanal of the Gen Z Movement Alliance, a youth-led civil society coalition mobilising for democratic accountability and governance reform in Nepal.

Anusha Khanal

Following Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s resignation in response to mass Gen Z-led protests, Nepal goes to the polls on 5 March. Some 19 million people — including 837,000 new voters — will choose from 120 registered parties. With unemployment and governance failures eclipsing traditional ideological debates, anti-corruption and inclusion demands have dominated the campaign.

What triggered the Gen Z protests, and how did the state respond?

The immediate trigger was the government revealing its authoritarian tendencies by banning 26 popular social media platforms. This happened during the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people exposed the wealth of politicians’ families, contrasting with widespread economic desperation. Inflation was high and unemployment among young people stood at around 23 per cent, and there were no pathways for change within existing political structures. But this wasn’t just about jobs. Young people demanded accountability for decades of corruption, poor governance, service delivery failures and a political system completely disconnected from our realities. The leaders of three parties had rotated in power for years without delivering anything meaningful. We mobilised because we had nothing to lose.

The response was brutal. On the first day of protests, police killed several young people. The government refused to show any responsibility, instead seeking to frame the movement as violent and deny it any legitimacy. It criminalised youth anger instead of listening to it. The choice to emphasise property damage over deaths when some buildings were burned and vandalised told us everything about where their priorities lay. The government showed it did not care about young people.

But repression didn’t stop the movement; it accelerated it. Thousands more young people mobilised, and eventually the pressure became impossible to ignore. Oli’s resignation was a forced concession. But it exposed something important: the political system only moves when threatened directly. That’s a lesson we’re carrying into these elections.

How did civil society organisations engage with the movement?

Young people created the movement, not civil society organisations. Once it started, we received a lot of support from wider civil society. It became a people’s movement, with people of all ages taking part, in person and in spirit. Many civil society groups made a conscious choice to support it, document what was happening, share knowledge, help shape narratives, amplify demands and help exert pressure to translate grassroots anger into political demands. We pushed for accountability, investigations into the killings, protection for protesters and systemic reforms around corruption and governance. We insisted that any negotiation include young people at the table, as stakeholders in decision-making.

A major win was a 10-point agreement with the interim government that included commitments to address corruption, improve governance, ensure youth participation in decision-making and move towards more inclusive democracy. We also pushed for the establishment of the Gen Z Council, a body designed to hold government accountable, monitor implementation of reforms and bridge the gap between the state and young people.

But we’ve been realistic about what civil society can and cannot do. We can organise, advocate, document and monitor. We cannot force a government to implement reforms if the bureaucracy resists or political will collapses after elections. That’s why we’re now focused on maintaining pressure and building systems that make it harder for future governments to ignore youth demands.

How have election candidates addressed the movement’s demands?

Anti-corruption and good governance have become dominant themes across party manifestos. All parties are talking about digital governance, e-governance, going cashless and paperless. Some are promising to establish commissions to investigate past corruption or audit public officials’ assets going back decades. Others focus on timecard systems for service delivery, budget transparency and digitisation of transactions. It’s just that corruption is so visible that ignoring it would be political suicide.

The problem is that most parties are vague on implementation. They describe the what but not the how. There are also ideological differences, but most parties are talking about systemic reform and public-private partnerships.

Across the board, parties are responding to the movement’s anti-corruption demand because they have to. The question is whether these commitments are genuine or just campaign rhetoric.

Why are women and excluded groups still so underrepresented among candidates?

Campaign financing is a massive problem. The government sets spending limits, but everyone knows that’s not what happens on the ground. To run a serious campaign with widespread reach, you need sponsorship from wealthy backers or business interests. If you’re a woman earning a minimum wage, you simply cannot compete against candidates funded by millionaires. There is no public financing system, no state support for candidates from marginalised backgrounds. The economic system excludes most women and poor people before we even get to party selection processes.

Safety is another critical issue that doesn’t get enough attention. Digital violence against women running for office is rampant. Women and queer candidates face abuse, harassment and threats online and offline. When we encourage female and queer colleagues to run, the response is often hesitancy, due to the lack of support and because we haven’t created safe enough spaces for them to participate in politics. Although the constitution guarantees women 33 per cent representation, the reality on the ground is completely different.

Then there’s the distribution of candidacy slots within parties, which is opaque and controlled by party leaders. Even after public pressure, many parties failed to meet the female quota in direct candidacies. Some did better in proportional representation slots, but even there, they selected women who are mostly well-connected and wealthy. The movement emphasised inclusion, but we’ve regressed when it comes to candidate selection.

What obstacles stand in the way of reform?

The first challenge is that we’re almost certainly heading towards a coalition government, which means compromise on every issue. When multiple parties have to negotiate and share power, reform agendas get watered down. Parties will prioritise holding their coalition together over pushing through the anti-corruption and governance reforms they promised. We’ve seen this pattern before. What isn’t clear yet is what kind of coalition will result and what compromises will be made.

The second challenge is the bureaucracy. Nepal’s bureaucracy can be notoriously resistant to change, transparency and accountability. A reform can pass parliament and still die in implementation because mid-level bureaucrats refuse to change how they work. Even though the law to establish the Gen Z Council has been passed, it hasn’t been formed yet. We can identify problems, document failures and advocate loudly, but we cannot force a government to act. If the bureaucracy decides to drag its feet, we have limited leverage. Structural incentives favour the status quo, and that’s before we even consider whether individual politicians will prioritise reforms over personal interests or patronage networks.

But we’re not giving up. Civil society’s role now is to maintain constant pressure, document what does and doesn’t get implemented and call attention when governments fail to keep their promises. The Gen Z Council gives us a formal mechanism to do this, and we can also raise our voices independently of it. We need to build broader coalitions, keep the movement’s demands visible in public discourse and make clear that if a government fails to deliver, there will be consequences. Real change is slow and difficult — but it’s possible if civil society stays organised and vigilant and doesn’t compromise on core demands.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Nepal’s Gen Z uprising: time for youth-led change CIVICUS Lens 10.Oct.2025
‘The government was corrupt and willing to kill its own people to stay in power’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikpal Khatri Chhetri 02.Oct.2025
‘The Social Network Bill is part of a broader strategy to tighten control over digital communication’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikshya Khadgi 28.Feb.2025

 

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