Union européenne

Il y a « un appétit pour la dette européenne », a-t-il affirmé

The post Macron ravive le débat sur l’étalement de la dette Covid de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Credit: Phil Nijhuis/ANP via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Yasmin Ullah, from Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya minority, is determined to see justice. On 13 April, she filed a complaint alleging genocide against Myanmar’s president, Min Aung Hlaing, to Indonesia’s Attorney General’s Office. Min Aung Hlaing led the 2021 coup that ousted a democratically elected government and this month was named president following a sham election held amid intense repression, rubber stamping the army’s continuing grip on power. However secure he appears in his position, Yasmin Ullah’s legal action offers hope his impunity may not be guaranteed.

The complaint accuses Min Aung Hlaing of genocide against Rohingya people, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group denied citizenship despite being long established in Myanmar. He’s accused of being responsible for the burning of Rohingya villages, forced evictions, killings and mass rape in a 2017 military operation, during which around 24,000 Rohingya people were killed and over 700,000 forced to flee. The UN’s fact-finding mission and its Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar have extensively documented atrocities. Civil society has played a key role in gathering testimonies from survivors and preserving evidence.

The case was made possible by changes to Indonesia’s criminal code that came into effect in January. While civil society has raised concerns about revisions to other parts of the code that restrict Indonesian people’s ability to speak out and protest, this particular change stands out as a positive development, enabling people to bring charges against alleged perpetrators of atrocities in other countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Universal jurisdiction on the rise

Universal jurisdiction applies to crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, on the grounds that these crimes are an offence against humanity as a whole and as such aren’t bound by borders.

Some states, including France and Germany, have passed laws to enable universal jurisdiction prosecutions. Many powerful states however still refuse to recognise the principle, citing national sovereignty, the long-established doctrine of immunity for heads of state and the potential for prosecutions to be politically motivated.

Yet the question of whether government leaders should be immune from prosecution has increasingly been contested. Immunity wasn’t granted when leaders of Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia were prosecuted for crimes committed during civil wars, and the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), removed the principle of immunity where it has jurisdiction. Ironically, the Trump administration, which resists international accountability over its officials, may have contributed to further eroding the doctrine of immunity by abducting Venezuela’s president Nicolás Maduro and placing him on trial for drug trafficking.

Universal jurisdiction cases have increased since the end of the Cold War. Belgium, Finland and Germany convicted people for their role in the Rwanda genocide. Switzerland secured the first guilty verdict for crimes committed in the Liberian civil war, while France convicted another Liberian war criminal in 2022. Germany convicted a Bosnian paramilitary soldier of genocide and, in 2021 and 2022, found two Syrian officials guilty of atrocity crimes.

Hopes of justice

Rohingya people have no hope of justice in a country that refuses even to recognise them as citizens, so diaspora civil society organisations are seeking it wherever they find opportunities. In 2025, an Argentinian court issued arrest warrants against Min Aung Hlaing and other senior Myanmar officials on crimes against humanity and genocide charges, in a case brought by a Rohingya organisation. Earlier this year, a human rights organisation filed a criminal case against the Myanmar regime in Timor-Leste. When authorities appointed a senior prosecutor to examine the case, Myanmar retaliated by expelling Timor-Leste’s ambassador.

These efforts complement proceedings in international courts. In 2024, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity, while in January, hearings began at the International Court of Justice in a case brought by the Gambian government accusing Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention. It isn’t a question of choosing between national jurisdictions and international courts, but rather of taking every avenue available to demand justice.

Universal jurisdiction has its limits. Those accused tend to be safe when they hold power; when states have successfully prosecuted perpetrators, it’s after they’ve lost the power that enabled their crimes. Currently, this means attempts to hold Israel’s leaders accountable for the genocide in Gaza, such as arrest warrants a Turkish court issued against 37 officials, only have symbolic value. Cases motivated by political point-scoring also risk discrediting the principle, as when a body created by Malaysia’s former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad found an array of US officials guilty in absentia, without legal basis or consequence.

Actions under universal jurisdiction, when targeted at evident offenders, can nonetheless help build moral pressure and signal that justice may eventually come. At a time when the brutal and illegitimate Myanmar regime is buttressed by China, India and Russia, and with the USA easing its pressure in pursuit of economic benefits, it matters that other countries keep holding the line, isolating the junta and exposing its atrocities.

It matters all the more when pressure comes from Southeast Asian countries, depriving the Myanmar regime of the excuse that human rights accountability is a western imposition. Two members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, have now taken action against a fellow member. But other attempts in the region have faltered. Philippine authorities declined to proceed when five survivors of atrocities filed a case in 2023, while an investigation civil society filed with Indonesia’s national human rights commission that same year, alleging that Indonesian companies were supplying military equipment to Myanmar, has so far seen no progress.

As 2026 president of the UN Human Rights Council, Indonesia is uniquely placed to take the lead in the pursuit of justice for atrocity crimes. Indonesian authorities must treat this case as a priority and give it the attention and resources it needs.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Les fraudeurs abusent de la confiance des gens à grande échelle, et les personnes âgées en Europe constituent leurs cibles privilégiées

The post INTERVIEW : Arrêtez de stigmatiser les victimes âgées d’escroqueries à l’IA, demande un responsable d’Interpol appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Credit: Nikada/iStock by Getty Images. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF)

By Abebe Aemro Selassie
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 27 2026 (IPS)

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies entered 2026 with significant momentum. The region had notched its fastest growth rate in 10 years—4.5 percent in 2025—buoyed by reduced macroeconomic imbalances, rising investment levels, and a generally supportive external environment.

Countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Rwanda led the charge, with growth exceeding 6 percent. The median inflation rate fell to about 3.5 percent and public debt levels had started to decline. These gains were hard-won, the fruit of politically difficult but meaningful reforms such as exchange-rate realignments, better spending allocation, and tighter monetary policies.

Progress on the fiscal front has been particularly impressive. The region’s general government primary balance has been steadily improving and is now near balance. By contrast, primary deficits in both advanced economies and other emerging markets remained noticeably wider in 2025 than before the pandemic.

Sub-Saharan Africa achieved this consolidation while simultaneously sustaining reasonably decent growth and bringing down inflation, thanks to bold reforms and notwithstanding headwinds from elevated global uncertainty and much reduced concessional financing.

And just as the region has begun to secure these gains, the war in the Middle East has brought a significant new shock that threatens to stall, or even unwind, that progress. It has pushed up global prices for oil, gas, and fertilizer, disrupted trade routes, and tightened financial conditions. These developments are weighing on the region’s outlook.

We expect growth to slow to 4.3 percent this year, some 0.3 percentage points below pre-war forecasts, while inflation is projected to rise. That may sound benign by global standards, but for a region where rapid growth is imperative to create millions of new jobs for the rapidly expanding population, any hit to growth is problematic.

Oil importers, many of them low-income or fragile states, face worsening trade balances and rising living costs. Oil exporters may benefit from higher oil prices, but remain exposed to volatility and the temptation of procyclical spending.

And the risks are mounting.

A prolonged conflict could further inflate commodity prices, trigger a risk-off episode in global markets, and force abrupt fiscal adjustments in countries with large refinancing needs.

In a severe downside scenario, as detailed in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook, regional output this year could fall 0.6 percent below pre-war forecasts, with oil importers suffering the most, and inflation could surge by an additional 2.4 percentage points.

The human costs are equally stark. Food insecurity looms large: the region remains acutely vulnerable to food-price shocks, and the war has already driven up fertilizer and shipping costs. A 20 percent rise in international food prices could push more than 20 million people into food insecurity and leave 2 million children under age 5 acutely malnourished.

Climate shocks intensify the strain—the recent floods in Mozambique and Madagascar serve as a reminder of the region’s deep vulnerability to weather disruptions.

The unprecedented decline in foreign aid strips away a critical buffer. Unlike past contractions, 2025 marked a sharp structural break in aid flows, with cuts falling hardest on the most fragile states and threatening to unravel essential services—healthcare above all—in countries with no alternative source of finance.

Debt vulnerabilities are also rising. More than one-third of countries are at high risk of, or already in, debt distress. In 21 countries, fiscal deficits exceed the levels that are needed to stabilize debt. Rising interest bills and dwindling concessional finance are inflating debt-service burdens and crowding out essential development spending.

In some cases, growing reliance on domestic borrowing has deepened ties between government debt and bank balance sheets, raising the specter of financial instability.

In this fraught environment, policymakers must navigate competing pressures. In the short term, they should anchor inflation expectations, shield the most vulnerable from rising prices, and avoid procyclical fiscal policies.

Oil exporters should treat windfalls as fleeting, using them to rebuild buffers and strengthen social safety nets. Oil importers with fiscal space can offer targeted, time-bound support; those without must focus on increasing the efficiency of spending and boosting domestic revenues.

Even as policymakers grapple with the immediate shock, the medium-term reform agenda cannot wait. The premium on accelerating structural reforms—to boost growth and resilience—is now even higher. Improving the business climate, strengthening governance, and reforming state-owned enterprises, especially in energy, transport, and telecommunications, can help attract investment and lift productivity. Deepening regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area could bolster supply-chain resilience and expand markets for local producers.

Digital transformation offers promise, but also highlights the region’s infrastructure gaps. Artificial intelligence is already helping farmers boost yields, doctors improve diagnoses, and students master difficult concepts faster.

But scaling such innovations will require investing in electricity, internet access, digital skills, and data governance. Today, just 53 percent of the region’s population has access to electricity, and only 38 percent to the internet.

International role

The international community has a role to play, especially when the economic troubles facing many countries stem largely from shocks beyond their control. Predictable financing, technical assistance, and capacity-building support can help countries weather current storms and sustain reform momentum.

Aid should be prioritized for low-income and fragile states, where alternative sources of finance are scarce. The IMF is already deeply engaged, with programs in 22 of the region’s 45 countries, and stands ready to scale up support for members facing acute balance-of-payments pressures linked to the war.

The optimism that greeted 2026 was not misplaced: it was earned, through years of difficult but necessary reform. The fallout from the war in the Middle East is now testing that progress, but it does not need to erase it. African policymakers have demonstrated they can deliver under pressure. The choices they make now—whether to hold the line on inflation, protect the vulnerable from the worst of the shock, and resist the temptation to unwind the reforms that got them here—will determine whether these hard-won gains endure.

The job of the international community is to support that effort. But the boldness and resolve that the moment demands must come from within the region itself.

This IMF blog is based on the April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, “Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure,” prepared by Cleary Haines, Michele Fornino, Saad Quayyum, Can Sever, Nikola Spatafora, and Felix Vardy.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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« Ça va se dégonfler comme une montgolfière. »

The post Sans soutien de l’État, le groupe de réflexion d’Orbán est voué à s’effondrer appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In the bustling Chifubu constituency of Ndola, the provincial capital of Zambia’s mineral-rich Copperbelt Province, 31-year-old Victoria Bwalya is usually among the early risers, cleaning and setting up for the day in her restaurant business. But before now, Bwalya’s hustle felt like a punishment and just a matter of survival. With only a primary school […]

Un sommet ensoleillé à Chypre a mis en évidence que le chemin menant à l'adhésion de Kiev à l'UE sera long et pourrait s'avérer semé d'embûches

The post Sous le soleil de Chypre, l’UE tempère les espoirs ukrainiens appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Également dans l'édition de lundi : Peter Mandelson, le Collège d'Europe, Brunner convoqué

The post De mystérieuses lettres secouent un organe de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Az ötvenes-hatvanas években egy magyar átlagember csak nagy ritkán jutott kézzelfogható közelségbe egy helikopterhez. Az ilyen alkalmak közé tartozott, amikor a Budapesti Nemzetközi Vásár (BNV) elődje, a Budapesti Ipari Vásár alkalmából lengyel és szovjet forgószárnyasok a fővárosba repültek. A május elsejei felvonulások és az április 4-i díszszemlék helyszínén, az egykori Felvonulási téren (ma Ötvenhatosok tere) készült fotókra a fortepan.hu oldalon bukkantam.

Mi-1-es, 1959

A lengyel gép látogatása idején 1959-et mutatott a naptár. A Mi-1-esek két év múlva jelentek meg a magyar katonai repülésben, ahol bő két évtizedig szolgáltak

Az időrendet tartva, kezdjük a Mi-1-essel. Az SP-SAE lengyel lajstromjelet viselő gép nem a Felvonulási téren szállt le, hanem közvetlenül mellette, a Városligetben, valószínűleg ott, ahol ma a Magyar Zene Háza áll. Maradjunk a Mi-1-es típusjelzésnél, de valójában egy lengyel gyártású SM-1-es változattal van dolgunk. A lengyelek 1956-ban még a Szovjetunióból szállított alkatrészekből szerelték össze az első négy gépet. Az első, teljes egészében a WSK-Swidniknél gyártott Mi-1-es 1957-ben hagyta el a gyárat és a gyártás egészen 1965-ig folytatódott. A Lengyelországban gyártott Mi-1-esek kilencven százaléka a Szovjetunióba került, de jutott belőlük többek között Magyarországra is. A Magyar Néphadsereg 1961 és 1982 között 27 darabot üzemeltetett a típusból, egy gépet ideiglenes jelleggel, egy másik példányt pedig véglegesen is átadott a rendőrségnek. A piros-fehér-zöld csillagos magyar felségjellel repült Mi-1-esek közül a típus 1982-es kivonásakor már csak tizenhat állt szolgálatban. 1959-be visszatérve: a Városligetben kiállított SP-SAE egy SM-1/600-as változat volt, amelynél a forgószárny lapátok élettartamát 600 órára sikerült növelni a kezdeti 150-ről. A lengyelek a Mi-1-es héthengeres AI-24-es csillagmotorjának licencét is megkapták és 1957-től Lit-3 jelzéssel gyártották.

[...] Bővebben!

C'est la plus jeune micronation au monde ; elle s'étend sur quatre hectares et demi dans une zone désertique près de la ville de San Diego, où tous les visiteurs du monde entier sont les bienvenus, affirme son sultan.

Au cours de l'histoire, les différents blocus ont eu des effets variés, mais ils ont souvent eu un impact social ou humanitaire considérable.

Au cours de la première moitié du XXe siècle, l'Allemagne a semé la terreur en Europe, mais aujourd'hui, ses voisins européens accueillent favorablement la remilitarisation allemande.

President of the European Council António Costa highlighted that the EU is a reliable and predictable partner for the region, following the discussions held in Lefkosia, Cyprus on 24 April 2026.

A Parlament, a Tanács és a Bizottság elnöke a mai napon aláírták az „Egy Európa, egy piac” ütemtervet.

Meloni a déclaré que cet avis confirmait que l'approche de l'Italie était la bonne et montrait que les deux dernières années avaient été « gaspillées » en procédures judiciaires abusives et infondées

The post Les centres d’accueil de migrants de Meloni en Albanie obtiennent le soutien d’un avocat général de la Cour de justice de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les poignées de main et les contacts humains sont plus efficaces que les coups bas, a affirmé Péter Tóth

The post « Pas de kompromat » : l’homme qui a renversé Orbán dévoile son secret appeared first on Euractiv FR.

« S'il n'y a pas de perspective européenne claire, les gens commenceront à se demander pour quoi les Ukrainiens meurent », a déclaré Anna Derevyanko

The post « Les gens se demandent pour quoi les Ukrainiens meurent » : le report de l’adhésion à l’UE risque de provoquer un tollé appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Premier ministre polonais Donald Tusk a également mis en doute la « loyauté » des États-Unis vis-à-vis de leurs engagements envers l'OTAN

The post Le Premier ministre tchèque Babiš balaie les propos de Trump sur l’OTAN appeared first on Euractiv FR.

L'UE dispose encore de « bien assez de temps » pour s'accorder sur son budget à long terme, a affirmé Luc Frieden à Euractiv

The post INTERVIEW : De nouvelles taxes pourraient « tuer » la compétitivité de l’UE, alerte le Premier ministre luxembourgeois  appeared first on Euractiv FR.