“Like countless other women I am tied to domestic work.” Credit: Learning Together.
By External Source
Dec 1 2025 (IPS)
I am an educated Afghan woman and a former government employee. I have long been active in women’s rights struggles, education, and community development. For me, living in Afghanistan is fraught with dangers and difficulties. In a context where women are denied the right to study, work, or participate in public life, my previous roles in government institutions and international organizations, and my afvocacy for women’s rights, place me at particular risk.
With the fall of the previous government and the Taliban takeover, all my work in women’s rights and civil society issues has effectively turned into a target on my back; I am now being pursued by Taliban operatives and others equally opposed to women’s freedom. I have been repeatedly threatened, both directly and indirectly, by the Taliban and individuals associated with the group.
These threats are not only directed at me as a women’s rights activist, but my husband is also facing similar threats for having worked for the previous government. Thus, our entire family is facing an array of hostile forces; it makes it difficult to continue living in Afghanistan.
Under these circumstances, perhaps it is useful to describe what an average day looks like for me.
My day begins at five in the morning. There is no electricity because our solar panels are old and no longer capture and store enough energy, so the house is dark. I find my way to the kitchen using my phone’s flashlight to prepare breakfast. I ration our flour carefully. Prices are high and wasting food is unthinkable.
The writer is from Bamiyan province in central Afghanistan. Credit: Learning Together.
I also use gas sparingly, only to prepare rice because it is expensive. I heat water using a small makeshift stove that runs on wood and store it away in thermos flasks for tea and other daily needs.
My youngest daughter wakes up and cries. I breastfeed her, and she falls back asleep. Then I take my son to school. Sometimes he is reluctant to go because he is afraid. The road is unsafe, and he does not have pocket money and is increasingly under peer pressure. Despite this, we manage to persuade him.
He often returns from school hungry. Breakfast is usually tea with dry bread or tea with sugar, so he is often undernourished and weak.
After my son has left for school, the rest of the family would then sit down and have our breakfast.
My husband usually goes away to the mountains to meet friends and former work colleagues, so I am often left alone at home with my daughter. By 8 a.m., I have had most of the house chores done before the children’s snack time at 10 a.m.
After finishing with the chores, I feed my daughter and put her down for a nap. It is time to do the laundry, which I do by hand every other day because children’s clothes need frequent washing due to their playing habits in the dirt.
After all the running around, when I can still find a little time, I try to revisit my books. I try to go over my old books or review notes on psychology and education that I studied years ago. It saddens me, because I know that in today’s Afghanistan I cannot continue my education or return to work.
Some days I feel so exhausted and unwell that I lack the energy to do housework or even tend properly to my daughter. But because this innocent child had no choice in being born into this world, I force myself to look after her. On many days, life feels unbearable.
Before noon I return to the kitchen to prepare lunch before my son returns from school at 12.00 p.m. Lunch is usually boiled potatoes and bread, which has become too repetitive for my children’s liking but we have no alternatives. They often cry, but eventually they eat their meal. By 1:30 p.m., the children are done with lunch. After that, I put them down for a nap, wash the dishes and then perform my prayers.
Doing the laundry is part of her daily routine. Credit: Learning Together.
In the afternoons, I teach English and basic literacy to women in the neighbourhood. These lessons help me to stay in contact with the people around us and maintain awareness of their general situation. It also brings some peace to all of us. Most of our conversations revolve around daily struggles – rising prices, lack of money, and worries about our children’s future. None of us has much hope, but sharing our burdens lightens up the gloom engulfing our lives and lifts our spirits.
Our home is outside the city center, in a village where we are not well known. This distance from the provincial center means the Taliban rarely come prowling, which makes the prohibited teaching easier. The women also come in small groups and bring no books or pens that might raise suspicion and likely filter back to the Taliban. I work with them at home, and the literate women take photos of the lessons on their phones, while the others learn on the spot, since they have no further opportunity to study in their own homes.
The learning also involves practicing household skills such as sewing clothes, attaching headscarves, and other practical crafts to maintain their skills.
My husband returns home in the evening, usually tired, disillusioned and very depressed. I try to comfort him, even though I am deeply worried myself. My son struggles with his schoolwork, often showing frustration. I have to sit with him and go over his lessons.
For dinner, I usually cook whatever is immediately available, most often, local rice because it is more affordable.
After dinner, which is usually around 8 p.m., and all the dishes are washed and stacked away, I try to revisit my online psychology studies at the university. Psychology is the subject needed in today’s circumstances, and I am passionate about it. I am truly grateful to those who have supported me in this endeavor, and I thank them for their help. Many of my difficulties are eased, and it brings me happiness.
When everyone goes to sleep, I am left alone lost in thought. I worry about my daughter’s future, knowing she cannot go to school in Afghanistan. I think back to the days when I studied at university and had big dreams. Now, all I can do is pray that someday women will again have the opportunity to study, work, and live freely.
Most nights, these thoughts keep me awake. I lie in bed until morning, exhausted and hopeless. By dawn, I feel as though I have already worked so hard that I cannot even lift myself from the bed. I wake up dizzy, weak, and depressed, yet the day begins again.
It’s important to share that I live this same daily routine every single day. I am no longer a government employee, and like countless other women, I am confined to my home, with no time for rest, leisure, or even a moment of freedom. In the past, days off meant visiting friends or relatives, exploring the city, or enjoying simple outings. Transportation and the possibility of movement made it all possible.
Now, the Taliban have banned women from walking the streets, entering public spaces, or even leaving home for the simplest errands. Every step outside is forbidden, every opportunity to live fully taken away.
I am deeply grateful to those who read these words of mine. Through you, I hope my silenced voice can be heard. I hope it can reach the outside world, not just for me, but for hundreds of women whose lives are trapped under the same restrictions. Together, perhaps, a path can be found to reclaim life, dignity, and hope. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.
Excerpt:
The author is an Afghanistan-based female journalist, trained with Finnish support before the Taliban take-over. Her identity is withheld for security reasonsThe international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.
Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.
The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.
Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.
The international context is changing profoundly, owing to rising autocratisation and the return of international war. These transformations also impact the long-standing problem of state fragility.
The IDOS Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) provides a differentiated model to measure state fragility along the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy. Rather than aggregating scores in these dimensions on a one-dimensional scale, the CSF identifies eight constellations of how deficits in these three dimensions occur jointly in reality. The CSF was launched in 2018 and was recently updated for the second time, now covering the period 2005 to 2024.
In this Policy Brief, we pursue three objectives. First, we briefly present the CSF model. Second, we describe the methodological adjustments of the 2025 update. This includes the use of a new measure for “battle-related deaths” – one indicator to assess the state’s monopoly on the use of force (authority). The modification became necessary due to a real-world development: the return of international war and, in particular, Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Third, we elaborate on the main empirical trend that emerges from the 2025 update: the global rise of deficits in the legitimacy dimension, reflected in the increase of “illiberal functioning” and “low legitimacy” states. This development is in line with wider autocratisation trends. We derive the following recommendations for policy and policy-related research:
• Use multidimensional models to assess state fragility. Foreign and development policymakers as well as academics should employ multidimensional approaches to conceptualise and measure state fragility. Not only are such models better suited for adequately capturing the complexity of state fragility, but they also provide better starting points for designing tailored policy interventions sensitive to context.
• Acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also rising in Europe. Rather than considering state fragility a phenomenon limited to the Global South, German and European policy-makers would be well advised to acknowledge that deficits in the legitimacy dimension are also growing in Europe, including countries of the European Union (EU). Studying developments in the Global South and mutual learning with Southern policy-makers and civil society actors may contribute to enhanced resilience in Europe as well.
• Explore the relationship between state fragility and international war. Future research should explore how international war and state fragility are related, including investigating the relationship between internal fragility dimensions and vulnerabilities to external shocks, and whether defence capabilities matter in determining whether and to what extent a state is fragile.
• Explore and address the relationship between state fragility and autocratisation. Investigating how state fragility and autocratisation are interrelated is a promising research agenda. This comprises exploring whether and how changes in fragility patterns and autocratisation trends are correlated as well as under what conditions autocratisation acts as a driver of state fragility by prompting violent resistance. Foreign and develop-ment policymakers could build on the findings to design coherent policy interventions.
Dr Sebastian Ziaja is Team Lead for Survey Data Curation at GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne.
A coastal community in the Eastern Caribbean. Small island states say their extreme climate vulnerability is still not reflected in global finance decisions made at COP30. Credit: Alison Kentish/IPS
By Alison Kentish
CASTRIES, St Lucia, Dec 1 2025 (IPS)
Caribbean small island states say this year’s UN climate conference has once again failed to deliver the urgency and ambition needed to tackle escalating climate devastation across the region. From slow-moving climate finance to frustrating political gridlock, leaders say COP30 did not reflect the realities that small islands are living through every day.
Jamaica is recovering from Hurricane Melissa, which left over 30 percent of the country’s GDP in losses and billions of dollars in damage. While the country has been able to respond rapidly thanks to a suite of innovative developmental finance tools, including a USD 150 million catastrophe bond, parametric insurance and a disaster savings fund, its Minister for Water, Environment and Climate Change, Matthew Samuda, warns that the vast majority of Caribbean islands do not have similar mechanisms.
Speaking at a press conference organized by Island Innovation and themed “Islands, the Climate Finance Gap, and COP30 Reflections,” Samuda said this is precisely why global negotiations must center the lived experiences of SIDS.
“I think I perhaps may be a little more disappointed than I am usually at the end of a COP because seeing what Jamaica is going through, seeing what Vietnam is going through, seeing extreme weather events pop up all around the world over the last 10 days, you would think that the urgency and the facts staring us in the face would have brought about greater ambition,” he said, adding that “unfortunately, the global geopolitical landscape didn’t allow for us to go much further.”
A Struggle Just to be Heard?
For many small islands and territories, simply participating meaningfully at COP30 was an uphill battle. The British Virgin Islands, like other Caribbean territories, had to rely on partners, including the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre for accreditation and access to the negotiations.
“We try to split up and cover as much as we can,” said Dr. Ronald Berkeley, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Climate Change. “Our reliance on partners shows how limited our reach still is.”
Berkeley said that despite the Caribbean’s visible and worsening climate impacts, it remains difficult to get major emitters to understand the region’s urgency.
“For small islands, this is real. I’m not sure a lot of the big players believe us,” he said. “Until you live through being almost blown to smithereens by a Category Five hurricane, you will never understand.”
The BVI recently established its own climate trust fund, currently funded with about US$5.5 million, to address some financing shortfalls, but Berkeley emphasized that this cannot make up for reliable, large-scale climate funding.
Barriers to Pledges
Caribbean officials are echoing the same concern—that climate finance exists on paper but rarely reaches small, vulnerable nations at the speed or scale required.
“At COP there were positive commitments, about US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035 for climate action, the tripling of adaptation finance and operationalizing the Loss and Damage Fund,” said Dr. Mohammad Rafik Nagdee, Executive Director of the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE).
“But the elephant in the room is the global finance gap,” he said. “Even where access exists, it’s not accessible at the speed the climate crisis demands. Processes are lengthy, requirements heavy and small governments simply don’t have the technical capacity.”
Nagdee said the region needs “greater predictability, simpler pathways and finance that is actually ready to disburse.”
Living Through it—Not Debating it
For Jamaica, which is emerging from one of the most devastating storms in its history, the mismatch between climate impacts and climate action is glaring.
“In the past four years, Jamaica has had its hottest day on record, its wettest day on record, its worst droughts, two tropical storms, a Category 4 hurricane and now what could be classified as a Category 6,” Samuda said. “That’s climate change in reality. That’s not an academic debate for us.”
Caribbean leaders widely described COP30 as a ‘mixed bag,’ with negotiations with incremental progress overshadowed by inadequate urgency.
“We cannot talk about building back better if the resources arrive slowly,” Nagdee said.
For small island states living on the frontlines of warming seas, rising temperatures and record-breaking storms, the message from COP30 is clear and becoming all-too familiar—that climate change is accelerating and the price of delay is already being paid.
This feature is published with the support of Open Society Foundations.
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Excerpt: