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Des centaines de camions ont bloqué durant deux jours les terminaux douaniers et des grands axes routiers de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Les transporteurs réclament des réformes urgentes et des allègements fiscaux pour un secteur asphyxié par deux décennies de bureaucratie. Un accord a été trouvé le 2 septembre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Economie, Questions européennes

L'opposition slovaque reproche à Robert Fico d'avoir prévu une troisième rencontre avec Vladimir Poutine, cette fois en Chine. Elle estime que cela isole le pays et l'aligne sur des puissances autoritaires au détriment de partenaires clés de l'Union européenne.

The post L’opposition slovaque demande à Robert Fico d’annuler sa visite en Chine et met en garde contre l’isolement du pays  appeared first on Euractiv FR.

How does international assistance impact public attitudes towards donors in the recipient country when tied to strategic interests? European leaders increasingly highlight the strategic and transactional nature of international assistance. Yet, we still do not know much about how such shifts in the framing of international assistance are perceived by the recipient public, especially in contexts with prevalent anti-Western attitudes and propaganda that dismisses aid as hypocritical and disingenuous. I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey to assess the attitudinal and quasi-behavioural effects of different types of international assistance post-disaster – conditional, unconditional, and strategic – and whether they help sway public attitudes in the face of authoritarian propaganda. Strategically distributed humanitarian aid decreased trust in the government as a defender of national interest among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic regime supporters, and also increased trust in European organisations. It did so partly by mitigating conspiracism and evoking positive emotions among pro-government voters whose views are hard to change. However, this comes at a cost: increased trade scepticism and decreased engagement with foreign media outlets among regime opponents. The findings have significant implications for international assistance strategies for increasing European soft power.  

How does international assistance impact public attitudes towards donors in the recipient country when tied to strategic interests? European leaders increasingly highlight the strategic and transactional nature of international assistance. Yet, we still do not know much about how such shifts in the framing of international assistance are perceived by the recipient public, especially in contexts with prevalent anti-Western attitudes and propaganda that dismisses aid as hypocritical and disingenuous. I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey to assess the attitudinal and quasi-behavioural effects of different types of international assistance post-disaster – conditional, unconditional, and strategic – and whether they help sway public attitudes in the face of authoritarian propaganda. Strategically distributed humanitarian aid decreased trust in the government as a defender of national interest among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic regime supporters, and also increased trust in European organisations. It did so partly by mitigating conspiracism and evoking positive emotions among pro-government voters whose views are hard to change. However, this comes at a cost: increased trade scepticism and decreased engagement with foreign media outlets among regime opponents. The findings have significant implications for international assistance strategies for increasing European soft power.  

La désignation du ministre d'Etat Romuald Wadagni comme candidat de la mouvance présidentielle pour l'élection de 2026 continue de faire des vagues positives à travers le pays. À Porto-Novo, de nombreux citoyens saluent ce choix qu'ils qualifient de rassurant, misant sur la compétence et l'expérience du technocrate pour poursuivre les acquis du régime Talon.

Governance theories offer a useful approach to policy by highlighting the need for multi-actor, multi-sectoral, and multi-level cooperation to deal with complex problems. Digitalisation, on the other hand, can be a means for managing networks, for helping to maintain the dynamics of meta-governance, and for generating problem-solving strategies based on knowledge exchange. Both seem to imply each other: governance requires tools to foster collaboration through the development of common understandings of problems, for which digitalisation can be instrumental. Effective digitalisation should foster governmental, social, and private steering towards public service, transparency, and the improvement of accountability. Digitalisation appears to require some basic conditions of governance related to fair access to services; beliefs and narratives that promote cooperation; processes of co-creation; and the interchange of information, as well as operative regulatory institutions. Governance and digitalisation together are fundamental for the management of complex policy problems. 
The aim of this Discussion Paper is theory advancement and refinement, linking assumptions about governance theories – particularly those resulting from the three waves of governance – to those of mainstream digitalisation literature. It formulates a research agenda to explore the possible mutual repercussions of those literature developments. The Discussion Paper is neither mainly descriptive nor prescriptive, but develops certain implications that stem from some fundamental problems of governance – defined as a process of multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level cooperation – and digitalisation. The research agenda is presented in the form of conjectures relevant to the Mexican case, related to the roles, functions, and expected results of different actors dealing with governance problems within the context of increased digitalisation. The conjectures advance possible research areas related to the role of digitalisation in meta-governance carried out by governmental actors; in those of network cooperation maintained by academic institutions; in the improvement of problem-solving by non-governmental organisations; and in the possible co-creation of new knowledge through information-based interactions by the media.

Francisco Porras is a professor and full-time research fellow at the Mora Research Institute (Instituto Mora), Mexico City.

Governance theories offer a useful approach to policy by highlighting the need for multi-actor, multi-sectoral, and multi-level cooperation to deal with complex problems. Digitalisation, on the other hand, can be a means for managing networks, for helping to maintain the dynamics of meta-governance, and for generating problem-solving strategies based on knowledge exchange. Both seem to imply each other: governance requires tools to foster collaboration through the development of common understandings of problems, for which digitalisation can be instrumental. Effective digitalisation should foster governmental, social, and private steering towards public service, transparency, and the improvement of accountability. Digitalisation appears to require some basic conditions of governance related to fair access to services; beliefs and narratives that promote cooperation; processes of co-creation; and the interchange of information, as well as operative regulatory institutions. Governance and digitalisation together are fundamental for the management of complex policy problems. 
The aim of this Discussion Paper is theory advancement and refinement, linking assumptions about governance theories – particularly those resulting from the three waves of governance – to those of mainstream digitalisation literature. It formulates a research agenda to explore the possible mutual repercussions of those literature developments. The Discussion Paper is neither mainly descriptive nor prescriptive, but develops certain implications that stem from some fundamental problems of governance – defined as a process of multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level cooperation – and digitalisation. The research agenda is presented in the form of conjectures relevant to the Mexican case, related to the roles, functions, and expected results of different actors dealing with governance problems within the context of increased digitalisation. The conjectures advance possible research areas related to the role of digitalisation in meta-governance carried out by governmental actors; in those of network cooperation maintained by academic institutions; in the improvement of problem-solving by non-governmental organisations; and in the possible co-creation of new knowledge through information-based interactions by the media.

Francisco Porras is a professor and full-time research fellow at the Mora Research Institute (Instituto Mora), Mexico City.

En désignant Romuald Wadagni comme candidat de la mouvance pour la presidentielle 2026, Patrice Talon a surpris. Ni chef de parti, ni homme de terrain, le ministre des Finances a pourtant obtenu l'adhésion des leaders de l'UP-R, Joseph Djogbénou, et du BR, Abdoulaye Bio Tchané.

‎À la fin de son second et dernier mandat, Patrice Talon a désigné son Ministre d'État, Romuald Wadagni, comme candidat de la mouvance pour la présidentielle de 2026. Wadagni n'est pourtant pas un leader politique au sens classique du terme. Face à lui, deux figures de poids auraient pu légitimement prétendre porter les couleurs du camp de la majorité au pouvoir : Joseph Djogbénou, président de l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R), et Abdoulaye Bio Tchané, président du Bloc Républicain (BR). Tous les deux chefs de parti disposent d'une longue expérience dans l'animation de la vie politique nationale, contrairement au ministre des Finances resté jusqu'ici dans une posture de technocrate.

‎Mais la donne constitutionnelle a aussi joué. Abdoulaye Bio Tchané, figure respectée du paysage politique, a atteint la limite d'âge fixée par la Constitution pour être candidat à la présidentielle. Forclos donc. Sa non-désignation n'a rien d'une mise à l'écart. Abdoulaye Bio Tchané aurait pu, à défaut de se représenter, proposer un candidat issu du parti Bloc Républicain.

‎Quant au président de l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau, il a préféré s'inscrire dans une démarche d'unité, bien que disposant de tous les atouts ou désigné un autre responsable pour porter les couleurs du parti.

‎Loin des rivalités habituelles, Djogbénou et Tchané ont choisi le consensus. Ils ont mis de côté leurs ambitions personnelles et leurs egos pour s'inscrire dans la logique de la réforme du système partisan. Les partis ne sont plus réduits à des instruments d'hommes forts, mais deviennent de véritables structures capables de s'accorder sur un profil jugé rassembleur.

‎La relégation de Djogbénou et Bio Tchané, traduit en réalité la cohérence de la réforme initiée sous Talon. Le choix de Wadagni illustre la volonté de tourner la page des querelles de leadership pour construire un camp présidentiel uni, à même d'affronter sereinement l'échéance de 2026.
Au-delà des ego, le consensus guide désormais la dynamique politique à la mouvance !
‎M. M.
‎

Climate change and unsustainable land and water practices are driving drought conditions across the world. Credit: United Nations/Mukhopadhyay S

By Hugo-Maria Schally
VIENNA, Austria, Sep 2 2025 (IPS)

The governance of nature and biodiversity has evolved from early 20th-century treaties on hunting and migratory species to today’s complex web of multilateral environmental agreements.

Initial efforts, such as the 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds useful to Agriculture, reflected utilitarian concerns, but by the 1970s global awareness of extinction and habitat loss led to more systemic instruments, including the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971) and Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973).

The 1992 Rio Earth Summit marked a turning point with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the first treaty to address biodiversity at genetic, species, and ecosystem levels, supported by the Global Environment Facility as a financial mechanism.

Since then, biodiversity governance has expanded through additional conventions, protocols and scientific platforms such as the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) but has also become increasingly fragmented.

Global biodiversity loss continues at alarming rates, despite this dense architecture of internationally agreed rules and institutions. Biodiversity related Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) span terrestrial, freshwater, and marine realms; regulate access to genetic resources and trade in species; set site based protections; and address drivers of land degradation and desertification. Yet, implementation remains hampered by institutional fragmentation, duplicative reporting burdens, and misaligned financial flows.

Against this backdrop, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) provides a shared vision for 2030 and 2050. Converting that vision into action requires not merely more resources, but better coordination—within and across MEAs, and between MEAs and broader sustainable development processes.

This article (i) maps the mandates and legal obligations of the principal biodiversity related MEAs, (ii) analyzes governance fragmentation and financial constraints, (iii) explores political dynamics among key actors, and (iv) proposes realistic, equity centred pathways for strategic coherence, with comparisons to the more integrated chemicals and waste cluster.

1. Mandates, Legal Functions, and Obligations of Key Biodiversity Related MEAs

1.1 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Protocols

The CBD’s tripartite objective—conservation, sustainable use, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources—is codified in Article 1. Parties are obligated to prepare and implement National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) and to report at regular intervals.

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety establishes precautionary and risk assessment procedures for the transboundary movement of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), while the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization operationalizes Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) by requiring national frameworks for access permits, benefit sharing, and compliance measures. The KMGBF provides a global goal and target structure to guide CBD implementation.

1.2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)

CITES regulates international trade through a system of appendices and permits, supported by compliance review and trade related measures. Its focus is targeted—ensuring that trade does not threaten species’ survival—complementing broader conservation duties under CBD. CITES’ decisions and periodic reviews create quasi regulatory effects at national borders, with enforcement typically delegated to customs and wildlife authorities.

1.3 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)

CMS requires range states to cooperate to conserve migratory species and their habitats, often via MoUs and specialized regional agreements. Its ‘umbrella’ function has catalyzed multiple instruments and action plans across taxa and flyways.

1.4 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands

Ramsar obliges Parties to designate wetlands of international importance and to promote their ‘wise use.’ Its compliance approach is facilitative and cooperative—anchored in site listing, monitoring, and the Montreux Record—rather than punitive measures.

1.5 World Heritage Convention (WHC)

The WHC, administered by UNESCO, integrates natural and cultural heritage through site nomination, protection, and monitoring. While enforcement is largely reputational (e.g., inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger), the Convention has proven influential in safeguarding globally significant ecosystems and landscapes.

1.6 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)

ITPGRFA establishes a Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-Sharing (MLS) for a defined list of crops and forages essential to food security. The proceeds from that system finances on the ground projects that sustain agrobiodiversity and farmer resilience. The Treaty complements CBD/Nagoya by providing sector specific ABS tailored to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.

1.7 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)

UNCCD aims to combat desertification and mitigate drought effects through national action programmes and regional cooperation. Its land use orientation connects directly to biodiversity and climate agendas, particularly on ecosystem restoration, drought resilience, and sustainable land management.

1.8 Agreement under UNCLOS on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)

The most recent addition to the MEA system for nature and biodiversity, the BBNJ Agreement, which has yet to enter into force, addresses conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction—roughly two thirds of the ocean. Its four pillars encompass marine genetic resources (including benefit sharing), area based management tools (including marine protected areas), environmental impact assessments, and capacity building/technology transfer. It complements the CBD, whose scope is limited to areas under national jurisdiction.

The Agreement foresees a COP, subsidiary scientific/technical bodies, a secretariat, and compliance arrangements; it also provides for benefit sharing modalities and a voluntary trust fund to support participation and early implementation.

2. Governance Fragmentation and Institutional Complexity

Biodiversity governance is institutionally dispersed across UNEP (CBD, CITES, CMS), FAO (ITPGRFA), UNESCO (WHC), independent or IUCN hosted secretariats (Ramsar), directly under UNGA ( UNCCD) and the UNCLOS system (BBNJ). This dispersion yields divergent rules, reporting schedules, compliance approaches, and scientific interfaces.

By contrast, the chemicals and waste cluster, where there is a uniform link to UNEP as a hosting institution, has progressively institutionalized synergies (shared services, coordinated COPs), producing clearer lines of authority and operational economies of scale.

2.1 UNEP and the Environment Management Group (EMG)

UNEP provides a convening platform and hosts several biodiversity secretariats; through the EMG it seeks to promote UN system wide coherence. However, neither UNEP nor EMG has binding authority over treaty bodies. Their effectiveness hinges on political buy in, voluntary coordination, and financing. Past reviews have cautioned against proliferating stand alone secretariats and have encouraged shared services and clustering where mandates allow.

2.2 Science–Policy Interfaces

IPBES has strengthened the knowledge base for biodiversity policy, but linkages to individual MEAs vary. Unlike the chemicals and waste cluster—which benefits from standing scientific committees (e.g., POPRC, CRC)—biodiversity MEAs rely on a patchwork of SBSTTAs, technical working groups, and ad hoc expert committees. A more connected science interface would support cross MEA target setting, monitoring, and methodological alignment.

2.3 Legal and Operational Overlaps

Overlaps are evident in ABS (CBD/Nagoya, ITPGRFA, and BBNJ), site based conservation (Ramsar, WHC, CBD), and species measures (CITES, CMS, CBD). Countries face capacity overload from multiple national focal points and asynchronous reporting cycles. Harmonized reporting and data platforms can reduce this burden; the CBD led Data Reporting Tool for MEAs (DaRT) could be a promising step if broadly adopted.

3. Financial Mechanisms and Constraints

Finance is the critical enabler of synergy. CITES, RAMSAR and CMS lack a dedicated financial mechanism and rely on ad hoc external funding, including from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF currently also serves as the financial mechanism for CBD and its Protocols, UNCCD, and is expected to support BBNJ related actions as these kick in after it’s entry into force. Cumulatively, GEF has allocated over USD 22 billion in grants with substantial co financing. Yet funding often flows through siloed windows aligned to individual MEAs, complicating multi convention projects.

3.1 Beyond GEF: Complementary Funds

The ITPGRFA MLS provides resources to farmer led conservation and breeding initiatives. Ramsar and WHC depend heavily on voluntary contributions and project finance, creating chronic underfunding for site management and monitoring.

The BBNJ Agreement includes a voluntary trust fund to facilitate early implementation and participation by developing countries as well as a special trust fund to be alimented by proceeds from the use of genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

3.2 Persistent Gaps and Fragmentation

Despite aggregate growth in biodiversity finance, Parties at CBD COP15 noted continuing gaps between ambition and available resources, alongside barriers to access and absorption. Integrated programming for cross MEA outcomes remains limited. By comparison, the chemicals and waste cluster uses joint services and synchronized COPs to align budgeting cycles, capacity building, and technical assistance, creating a more coherent pipeline of support.

4. Political Dynamics and Major Actor Positions

Political economy shapes what institutional designs can achieve. Secretariats tend to protect their autonomy; governments weigh sovereignty, trade, and development priorities; and equity concerns remain salient. Contention around digital sequence information (DSI) and ABS illustrates divergent interests across MEAs.

4.1 Major Actors

• United States: outside CBD and Nagoya; engages actively in CITES and sectoral bodies; cautious on multilateral ABS.
• China: strong role in CBD/KMGBF; supportive of capacity building; cautious about far reaching benefit sharing modalities under BBNJ.
• India and Brazil: emphasize equity, technology transfer, and fair benefit sharing; wary of burdens without commensurate support.
• European Union: generally cohesive advocate for biodiversity ambition and cross MEA coordination, though internal sectoral trade offs (e.g., agriculture) persist.
• African Group, strong on conservation and sustainable use, focused on the provision of additional financial resources and keen on the establishment of dedicated financial mechanisms.

4.2 Ocean Governance Politics

The BBNJ Agreement must navigate interactions with existing sectoral and regional bodies, notably RFMOs. Debates over institutional hierarchy, benefit sharing of MGRs (including DSI), and standards for ABMTs/EIAs reflect broader geopolitics and North–South equity concerns.

5. Comparative Insights and Pathways Toward Strategic Coherence

5.1 Lessons from the Chemicals and Waste Cluster

The BRS Conventions operationalize synergies through: (i) joint services and administrative functions; (ii) back to back or joint COPs; (iii) harmonized technical assistance and capacity building strategies; and (iv) standing scientific committees.

While mandates remain distinct, institutionalized coordination has yielded efficiencies in budgeting, technical support, and compliance assistance. The Minamata Convention on Mercury, though separate, benefits from and contributes to shared technical platforms and capacity building networks.

5.2 A Practical Synergy Agenda for Biodiversity MEAs

1) Joint Work Plans under the KMGBF: Develop time bound, target linked joint programs among CBD, CITES, CMS, Ramsar, WHC, UNCCD, ITPGRFA, and (as it matures) BBNJ. Prioritize cross cutting areas such as ecosystem restoration, invasive species, wildlife trade, and genetic resources.
2) Harmonized Reporting and Data Architecture: Scale up the CBD DART platform across MEAs; align indicators, metadata standards, and submission cycles.
3) Integrated Funding Windows: Establish a GEF multi MEA ‘synergy window’ either under the General Trust Fund or under the GBFF to finance projects that deliver jointly against KMGBF targets and related MEA obligations; incentivize national level integrated programming and shared enabling activities.
4) Coordinated Capacity Building: Create a joint help desk and roster of experts servicing multiple MEAs; bundle regional training; and promote South–South cooperation.
5) Science Interface Linkages: Mandate reciprocal participation of scientific bodies (e.g., SBSTTAs, CMS Scientific Council) and further formalize channels between IPBES and all biodiversity MEAs.
6) UNEP/EMG and UNEA Leadership: Utilize UNEA to adopt resolutions inviting MEAs and UN agencies to report on synergistic implementation and to pilot joint services.
7) National Level Integration: Encourage ‘Integrated Biodiversity Implementation Plans’ that consolidate NBSAPs with Ramsar site strategies, WHC site management plans, CITES/CMS action plans, UNCCD NAPs, and—where relevant—BBNJ commitments. This reduces duplication and clarifies institutional responsibilities.

5.3 Guardrails for Equity and Effectiveness

Synergy must not translate into additional burdens on developing countries without resources. Equity guardrails can include: predictable finance; technology cooperation; fair access to genetic resources and DSI benefits; and attention to indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights. Political buy in improves when integration demonstrably reduces workload (e.g., one integrated report instead of many) and mobilizes additional finance.

6. Conclusion

Biodiversity MEAs collectively provide a comprehensive rulebook, but fragmentation blunts their impact. The KMGBF offers a unifying roadmap; the BBNJ Agreement extends governance to the global commons. By institutionalizing joint work, harmonizing reporting and data, integrating finance, and strengthening science and coordination functions, the biodiversity regime can replicate the practical synergies achieved in the chemicals and waste cluster—while also emphasizing equity and capacity.

The alternative is continued inefficiency and missed outcomes during a critical decade for nature. Given the institutional complexities of the biodiversity related MEAS it might be advisable to establish a two step process. Bringing the UNEP hosted secretariats closer together and based on possible results open a broader process to see how the other MEAs that are hosted by other institutions could be brought in.

Hugo-Maria Schally is former Head of the Multilateral Environmental Cooperation Unit at the Directorate-General for Environment, European Commission.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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The European Defence Agency (EDA) has published its annual Defence Data report for 2024-2025, detailing defence spending from all 27 EU Member States.  In 2024, defence expenditure by the 27 EU Member States reached an unprecedented €343 billion — a 19% rise on 2023 — bringing spending to 1.9% of GDP. The increase, driven largely by record levels of equipment procurement and rising investment in research and development, reflects Member States’ determination to strengthen Europe’s military capabilities in response to the evolving security environment.  

For the full document, please see here

For the first time, defence investment exceeded €100 billion, accounting for 31% of total expenditure, the highest share recorded by EDA since data collection began. While spending continues to grow and is forecast to climb further in 2025, it remains below the levels of military powers such as the United States — underlining the need for sustained investment and greater collaboration to maximise efficiency and ensure interoperability across the EU’s armed forces. 

Head of EDA, HRVP Kaja Kallas, said: "Europe is spending record amounts on defence to keep our people safe, and we will not stop there. This investment will be funnelled into everything from research and development to the joint procurement and production of essential defence components. The European Union is pulling every financial and political lever we have to support our Member States and European companies in this effort. Defence today is not a nice-to-have but fundamental for the protection of our citizens. This must be the era of European defence."

EDA Chief Executive André Denk said: “It is encouraging to see EU Member States taking their defence spending to record levels. Meeting the new NATO target of 3.5% of GDP will require even more effort, spending a total of more than €630 billion a year. Yet we must also cooperate closely, find economies of scale and increase interoperability. EDA stands more ready than ever to support Member States in this endeavour." 

   2025 Forecast:

• EU defence spending is projected to reach €381 billion in 2025 (vs €343 billion in 2024)
• Bloc’s spending is seen at 2.1% of GDP in 2025, exceeding the previous NATO 2% target for the first time since EDA records began
• Defence investment is set to reach close to €130 billion in 2025 (vs €106 billion in 2024)
• Research and Development (R&D) spending may increase to €17 billion in 2025 (vs €13 billion in 2024) 

2024 European Defence Spending – Key Findings:

• In 2024, 25 Member States increased their defence spending in real terms, one more than in 2023, while only two countries slightly decreased defence spending. Sixteen Member States raised their expenditure by more than 10%, compared to eleven in 2023.  
• In 2024, the total defence expenditure per active military personnel reached a record €249,000, up from €211,000 in 2023 and significantly more than the €138,000 spent in 2014. 
• In 2024, 24 Member States met the 20% benchmark on defence investment, up from 20 in 2023, an accelerating trend as countries direct an increasingly larger share of their expenditure to investments.
• Defence equipment procurement rose by 39% from 2023 to €88 billion in 2024, with spending in 2025 projected to exceed €100 billion. The upward trend is expected to continue as several Member States have announced further budget increases and signed major procurement deals in 2024.
• Equipment procurement represents more than 80% of defence investment. While short-term needs have led Member States to prioritise existing solutions, R&D investment has grown.
• A significant rise in R&D spending is essential to develop next-generation capabilities and reduce dependence on foreign markets. Defence cooperation offers benefits such as economies of scale, lower costs, improved interoperability, and reduced duplication.
• In 2024, defence R&D expenditure increased. The 20% rise in 2024 represents a notable acceleration compared to the 6% growth recorded in 2023. Defence R&D spending reached €13 billion in 2024.

Les pôles industriels du cœur de l'Europe se tournent vers le piégeage et le stockage du carbone pour transformer le CO2 lié au réchauffement climatique en une ressource commerciale.

The post La Carbon Valley, le futur atout industriel de l’Europe  appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In today’s edition: Germany slamming von der Leyen’s military ambitions, Italy considering a fiscal escape clause to boost defence spending, enlargement talks stalling in Copenhagen, Brussels shelving its safe countries list, and a petition pushing the EU to act on abortion access

The European steel industry is on the brink. A 50% tariff on steel imports into the United States and the lack of a bilateral agreement to preserve EU steel exports to the U.S. under the recent EU-U.S. Joint Statement on...

Un livreur a été agressé sur un trottoir de Bucarest parce qu'il était étranger. La semaine précédente, un dirigeant d'AUR, le principal parti d'extrême droite du pays avait stigmatisé cette catégorie de la population.

- Le fil de l'Info / Politique, Roumanie, Migrants Balkans, Courrier des Balkans, Société

Marking the war’s 86th anniversary, Poland’s president renews a politically charged call for €1.5 trillion in German reparations – despite government doubts over its feasibility

Slovakia’s opposition lashes out at Prime Minister Fico for planning a third meeting with Putin – this time in China – warning it isolates the country diplomatically and aligns it with authoritarian powers over key EU partners

Industrial clusters in Europe’s heartland look to carbon capture and storage to turn CO2 from climate liability into a commercial resource

Slovakia may be a small player, but a European government that arbitrarily seizes the savings of its citizens sets a very bad precedent for an effort to scale up Europe’s venture capital ecosystem

Across Europe in women's soccer, a significant number of both coaches and players reported altering their behaviour due to gendered expectations

Compelling evidence to suggest Lebanese Shia leader Musa al-Sadr was killed in Libya is uncovered by BBC.