La Police républicaine mené une opération nocturne sur le boulevard de la Marina, dans le 12ᵉ arrondissement de Cotonou, pour mettre un terme aux rodéos urbains communément appelés « zéwé ». Bilan de l'intervention : 2 adolescents arrêtés et 18 engins immobilisés.
Les policiers ont investi, dans la nuit du dimanche 1er mars au lundi 2 mars 2026, le boulevard de la Marina. Ce tronçon très fréquenté est devenu ces derniers mois un point de ralliement de jeunes conducteurs adeptes de rodéos urbains ou motorisés communément appelés « zéwé ».
Aux environs de minuit, deux adolescents qui multipliaient les accélérations et démonstrations avec leurs motos sur le boulevard ont été interpellés par la police.
Ils ont été placés en garde à vue et seront présentés au parquet du tribunal de première instance de Cotonou jeudi 05 mars 2026.
Au cours de la même opération, dix-huit motocyclettes ont été contrôlées et mises en fourrière pour vérifications.
La montée des rodéos motorisés à Cotonou inquiète. Des axes comme la Marina, le boulevard Saint-Michel, Akpakpa ou encore les abords de l'aéroport de Cotonou sont régulièrement ciblés pour ces rassemblements nocturnes.
Face à la recrudescence du phénomène, la Police républicaine affiche une ligne dure. Les autorités rappellent que ces exhibitions, souvent relayées sur les réseaux sociaux, exposent leurs auteurs à des poursuites pénales.
Le rodéo motorisé (ou urbain) est un délit consistant à réaliser des acrobaties (wheelings, dérapages) avec un engins à deux ou plusieurs roues, compromettant la sécurité et la tranquillité publiques.
Les auteurs de ce type de délit encourent une peine d'emprisonnement et des amendes.
M. M.
Le tribunal de commerce de Cotonou a prononcé la résiliation d'un contrat de location de titres fonciers opposant la Société Centrale COOP aux sociétés Société ALTERNATIF BTP et Société Togolaise de Travaux et de Commerce (STTC). Le jugement a été rendu le 27 février 2026.
Le litige, qui dure depuis 2022, porte sur le non-paiement de commissions et l'immobilisation de garanties immobilières auprès d'une banque.
Centrale COOP avait mis à disposition trois titres fonciers (situés à Cotonou, Porto-Novo et Lokossa) pour permettre aux entreprises ALTERNATIF BTP et Société Togolaise de Travaux et de Commerce (STTC) d'obtenir une ligne de crédit de 350 millions de FCFA auprès de la banque. En échange, les preneurs devaient verser une commission annuelle de 5%, soit 17,5 millions de FCFA.
Selon les faits consignés dans le jugement, les deux sociétés de BTP n'ont versé que 7 millions de FCFA sur la première année et n'ont jamais restitué les titres à l'échéance prévue le 16 février 2023.
Le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou a relevé une « inexécution persistante et caractérisée » des conventions.
Pour les juges, le non-paiement des commissions « vide le contrat de sa substance et rompt définitivement l'équilibre » entre les parties.
Le gérant de Centrale COOP a déploré une « privation prolongée et injustifiée de ses biens ».
Appelée en cause, la Banque a tenté en vain de faire dessaisir le tribunal au profit du juge des saisies immobilières. La banque a argué qu'une procédure de réalisation d'hypothèque était déjà en cours suite au défaut de paiement d'Alternatif BTP, dont la dette s'élèverait à plus de 52 millions de FCFA. Le tribunal a toutefois balayé cette exception de connexité, soulignant que la résiliation du bail est une « procédure autonome » qui ne saurait être absorbée par le contentieux de l'exécution forcée.
Le tribunal a condamné solidairement Alternatif BTP et STTC à verser à Centrale COOP la somme de 27 015 027 FCFA. Ce montant correspond aux commissions dues pour la période du 16 février 2024 au 2 septembre 2025.
« Les sociétés preneuses ayant conservé les titres fonciers au-delà du terme contractuel initial (...) la convention doit être regardée comme s'étant poursuivie de fait », précise le jugement N° 012/2026/CJ2/S1/TCC du 27 février 2026. Le tribunal rappelle que « les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites ».
La demande portant sur 28 millions de FCFA, déjà accordée par un précédent jugement en 2025, est déclarée irrecevable pour « autorité de chose jugée ».
La demande de dommages-intérêts supplémentaires a été rejetée. Le tribunal estime que le préjudice est déjà couvert par les commissions accordées.
La décision est susceptible d'appel
M. M.
Image: Hiroshi-Mori-Stock / shutterstock.com and 内閣広報室 / Cabinet Public Affairs Office / Wiki Commons
By Ria Shibata
Mar 3 2026 (IPS)
Sanae Takaichi’s electoral victory in February marks a historic turning point in Japanese politics. As Japan’s first female prime minister and the leader of a commanding parliamentary majority, she represents change in both symbolic and strategic terms. Conventional wisdom long held that younger Japanese voters leaned progressive, were sceptical of assertive security policies, and disengaged from ideological nationalism. Yet a segment of digitally active youth rallied behind a politician associated with constitutional revision, expanded defence capabilities, and a more unapologetic articulation of national identity. This shift cannot be reduced to a simple conservative swing. Rather, Takaichi’s rise reflects a deeper transformation in how democratic politics is constructed in the digital age: the growing power of imagery, digital mobilisation, and algorithm-driven branding in shaping political choice—particularly among younger voters.
Takaichi’s approval ratings among voters aged 18–29 approached 90 per cent in some surveys, far surpassing those of her predecessors. Youth turnout also rose, suggesting that Japanese youth are not politically apathetic. On the contrary, they are paying attention—but the nature of that engagement has changed. Viral images, short video clips, hashtags, and aesthetic cues travelled faster and farther than policy briefings. For many younger voters, engagement began—and sometimes ended—with the visual and emotional appeal of the candidate. This pattern is not uniquely Japanese. However, the scale of its impact in this election suggests that political communication has entered a new phase in which digital imagery can shape electoral outcomes as much as—or more than—substantive debate.
A New Phase of Digital Politics in Japan
In the months leading up to the election, Takaichi’s image proliferated across social media platforms. Supporters circulated clips highlighting her confident demeanour and historic candidacy. A cultural trend sometimes described as ‘sanakatsu’ or ‘sanae-mania’ framed political support as a form of fandom participation. Hashtags multiplied. ‘Mic-drop’ moments went viral. Even personal accessories—her handbags and ballpoint pens—became symbolic conversation pieces.
Political enthusiasm has always contained emotional and symbolic elements. What is new is the speed and scale at which digital platforms amplify them. Algorithms reward content that provokes reaction—admiration, anger, excitement. A charismatic clip often outperforms a detailed explanation of fiscal reform. For younger voters raised in scroll-based media environments, political information increasingly arrives as curated snippets. Policy complexity competes with—and often loses to—aesthetic immediacy.
Post-election surveys and interviews suggested that many first-time voters struggled to articulate specific policy distinctions between parties. Instead, they cited impressions—strength, change, decisiveness, novelty—suggesting that digital engagement does not automatically translate into policy literacy. Political identity can form through repeated exposure to imagery and narrative rather than sustained examination of legislative proposals. When campaigns are optimized for shareability, they are incentivized to simplify. Nuance compresses poorly into short-form video.
The Politics of Strength in an Age of Uncertainty
Japan’s younger generation has grown up amid prolonged economic stagnation, regional insecurity, and global volatility. China’s rise, tensions over Taiwan, North Korean missile launches, and persistent wage stagnation form the backdrop of their political participation. For many, the future feels uncertain and structurally constrained.
In such an environment, Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric carried emotional resonance. Her emphasis on strengthening national defence, revisiting aspects of the postwar settlement, and making Japan “strong and rich” projected clarity rather than ambiguity. Where institutional politics can appear technocratic or slow, decisive messaging offered the voters psychological reassurance.
At the core of her appeal is a narrative of restoring a ‘strong’ Japan. Calls for constitutional revision and expanded defence capabilities are framed as steps toward recovering national self-confidence. For younger Japanese fatigued by protracted historical disputes and what some perceive as externally imposed guilt, language emphasising pride and sovereignty resonates more readily than complex historical debates. This may not signal a rejection of peace. Rather, it may reflect a generational reframing of peace itself—understood not solely as pacifism, but as deterrence, defence capability, and strategic autonomy. Messages stressing ‘sovereignty’, ‘strength’, and ‘normal country’ can circulate more effectively in shareable digital formats than nuanced and complex historical analysis.
A Global Pattern: Virtual Branding, a Democratic Crossroads
Japan’s experience mirrors a broader transformation in democratic politics: the rise of virtual branding as the central organizing principle of electoral strategy. In earlier eras, campaigns revolved around party platforms and televised debates. Today, strategy increasingly begins with platform optimization. Campaigns are designed not only to persuade, but to perform within algorithmic systems. The guiding question is no longer only “What policies do we stand for?” but “What content travels?”
The election of Donald Trump in the United States illustrated how virtual media strategy can reshape political competition. Memorable slogans and emotionally charged posts dominated attention cycles, often eclipsing policy detail. Scholars have described this as “attention economics in action”: the candidate who captures digital attention shapes political reality before formal debate even begins. More recently, figures such as Zohran Mamdani have demonstrated how youth-centered digital branding can mobilize support with remarkable speed. Campaigns became participatory; supporters did not merely consume messaging but actively distributed political identity.
Takaichi’s recent victory reflects the evolving mechanics of digital democracy. Her leadership will ultimately be judged not by imagery but by governance — by whether her policies deliver economic stability, regional security, and social cohesion. The broader question, however, transcends any single administration. It means political decisions have migrated into digital environments optimised for speed and visual communication. In an age where images travel faster than ideas, democratic choice risks being guided more by what is seen than by what is discussed. In such an environment, political campaigns will be forced to adapt, and produce content that performs well within these algorithmic constraints. Over time, this may reshape voter expectations and politics will begin to resemble influencer culture. Campaigns that fail to master digital branding risk will appear outdated. Those that succeed can mobilize youth at scale.
Democracy has always balanced emotion and reason. The challenge today is ensuring that emotion does not eclipse reason entirely. The future of informed citizenship may depend on restoring that balance. This does not suggest that previous eras were immune to personality politics. What has changed is the proportion. The digital environment magnifies symbolic cues and compresses policy discussion. If democracies wish to maintain robust deliberation, they must consciously rebalance image and substance. This requires civic education focused on media literacy, virtual platform incentives that elevate substantive debate and political leadership willing to engage in depth, not just virality. And the responsibility is collective—voters, educators, media institutions, and candidates alike. The question facing democracies is whether this transformation can coexist with substantive deliberation or whether branding will increasingly overtake it.
Related articles:
Japan Stumbles: The Taiwan Fiasco
The New Takaichi Administration: Confronting Harsh Realities on the International Stage
Middle Powers After Davos
Ria Shibata is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, and the Toda Peace Institute in Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on identity-driven conflicts, reconciliation, nationalism and the role of historical memory in shaping interstate relations and regional stability in Northeast Asia.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau
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Written by Ivana Katsarova.
Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types.
Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure.
The EU’s core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non‑intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed.
A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs.
The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU‑wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging.
Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Food contact materials in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.