Feed aggregator

Plenary session, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le passeport béninois donne accès, sans visa préalable ou au moyen d'une procédure d'entrée facilitée, à 39 des 53 destinations africaines comptabilisées dans la couverture régionale, soit 73,6 %. Dans le classement du passeport béninois, il occupe la 135e place mondiale avec un score de mobilité de 67 et un taux d'accès mondial de 33,8 %. Ces indicateurs additionnent les destinations accessibles sans visa, celles relevant du visa à l'arrivée ou d'un dispositif facilité, ainsi que les autorisations électroniques de voyage.

À l'échelle mondiale, 35 destinations figurent dans la catégorie sans visa, 30 dans la catégorie visa à l'arrivée ou entrée facilitée et 2 sous autorisation électronique de voyage. Les 67 accès ainsi comptabilisés correspondent au score de mobilité du passeport. Pour 131 destinations, un visa préalable reste requis, soit 66,2 % des destinations couvertes par le rapport.

L'Afrique concentre la couverture la plus élevée

La couverture africaine se distingue nettement du profil mondial. Sur 53 destinations africaines comptabilisées, 22 sont accessibles sans visa, 16 par visa à l'arrivée ou autre procédure facilitée et une sous autorisation électronique de voyage. Quatorze destinations africaines demandent un visa préalable. Le Bénin se classe par ailleurs 21e parmi 54 pays dans le classement continental africain.
Parmi les accès sans visa recensés figurent notamment le Ghana et le Sénégal, avec une durée indiquée de 90 jours, le Togo avec 30 jours, le Kenya avec 60 jours et l'Afrique du Sud avec 30 jours. La Côte d'Ivoire est également indiquée à 90 jours. Le Cap-Vert apparaît dans la catégorie sans visa avec la procédure EASE. Ces durées et formalités sont rattachées individuellement aux destinations dans le rapport.
Dans la catégorie visa à l'arrivée ou entrée facilitée, le rapport recense notamment le Maroc, le Gabon, l'Ouganda, la Tanzanie, le Mozambique, la Mauritanie et Madagascar. Plusieurs de ces destinations indiquent aussi la disponibilité d'un eVisa, ce qui explique pourquoi cette catégorie ne doit pas être lue comme du seul visa délivré à la frontière.

Des écarts importants entre régions

La couverture est beaucoup plus limitée hors d'Afrique. En Europe, les 47 destinations comptabilisées exigent un visa préalable, soit 100 % de la région. Le même résultat apparaît pour les six pays du Golfe, les cinq destinations d'Asie centrale et les 17 destinations du Moyen-Orient figurant dans le rapport.
En Asie, l'accès sans visa préalable ou par procédure facilitée concerne 14 destinations sur 50, soit 28,0 % : quatre sans visa, neuf par visa à l'arrivée ou dispositif facilité et une sous autorisation électronique de voyage. Dans les Caraïbes, huit destinations sur 16 sont accessibles sans visa préalable ou par procédure facilitée, soit 50,0 %. La couverture atteint 30,4 % en Amérique du Nord, 28,6 % en Océanie et 25,0 % en Amérique du Sud.
Des classements de contexte complètent le profil
Au-delà du classement mondial, le rapport situe le passeport béninois dans plusieurs groupes de comparaison. Il est 10e sur 29 pays dans le classement lié à la langue française et 1er sur 8 pays partageant le franc CFA d'Afrique de l'Ouest. Il se place également 23e sur 57 au sein de l'Organisation de la coopération islamique, 21e sur 54 parmi les pays de l'Union africaine, 81e sur 132 dans le G77 et 125e sur 159 parmi les membres de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce.

Le classement de l'accueil, qui mesure la facilité d'entrée offerte aux passeports étrangers vers le Bénin, place le pays au 118e rang sur 199. Les exigences de visa pour entrer au Bénin concernent donc le mouvement inverse de celui mesuré par le classement du passeport béninois : elles décrivent les conditions imposées aux voyageurs étrangers qui se rendent au Bénin.

Les signaux de réciprocité montrent deux mouvements opposés

Le rapport identifie 20 situations dans lesquelles un passeport étranger peut entrer au Bénin sans visa, avec une autorisation électronique ou avec un visa à l'arrivée, alors que le titulaire du passeport béninois doit obtenir un visa pour la destination correspondante. Il recense parallèlement 21 situations inverses : le passeport étranger doit obtenir un visa pour entrer au Bénin, tandis que le passeport béninois bénéficie d'un accès sans visa préalable, d'une autorisation électronique ou d'une procédure facilitée vers le pays concerné. Ces données sont présentées comme des signaux de réciprocité et ne comportent pas d'interprétation politique ou diplomatique.
Des durées et formalités spécifiques selon la destination
Les conditions d'accès comportent aussi des durées et formalités particulières. Les Bahamas, la Barbade, l'Équateur, le Ghana, le Sénégal et la Tunisie sont indiqués avec une durée de 90 jours dans la catégorie sans visa. Les Philippines et l'Afrique du Sud sont indiquées à 30 jours, tandis que Hong Kong est indiqué à 14 jours. La Malaisie et Singapour figurent parmi les accès sans visa avec carte d'arrivée et une durée de 30 jours, tandis que le Suriname est associé à une carte de tourisme et 90 jours.
Parmi les procédures facilitées, le Népal est indiqué avec une durée de 150 jours et la disponibilité d'un eVisa, tandis que plusieurs autres destinations affichent des durées de 30 ou 90 jours. Les deux autorisations électroniques de voyage recensées concernent les Seychelles, avec enregistrement touristique et 90 jours, et le Sri Lanka, avec 30 jours.
L'ensemble des données dessine ainsi un profil fortement centré sur la mobilité régionale africaine, où près de trois quarts des destinations couvertes sont accessibles sans visa préalable ou via un mécanisme facilité. À l'inverse, le visa préalable demeure la règle pour l'intégralité des destinations européennes, du Golfe, d'Asie centrale et du Moyen-Orient recensées. Les indicateurs mondiaux, régionaux et de réciprocité permettent de distinguer clairement l'accès dont disposent les titulaires d'un passeport béninois et les conditions appliquées aux passeports étrangers entrant au Bénin.

Source : Rapports sur les passeports

Au Bénin, la campagne de commercialisation des amandes de karité au titre de la période 2026-2027 a démarré le mercredi 9 septembre 2026. Elle se poursuivra jusqu'au 31 mai 2027.

La campagne de commercialisation de karité a démarré au Bénin. Les conditions de déroulement de cette campagne ont été précisées par le gouvernement à travers un communiqué de presse conjoint signé par le ministre du Commerce intérieur, chargé de la Formalisation de l'économie, le ministre de l'Agriculture, de l'Élevage et de la Pêche, ainsi que le ministre du Tourisme et du Commerce extérieur.

À travers ce communiqué, les autorités rappellent aux acteurs et au public les dispositions encadrant la commercialisation des amandes de karité durant cette campagne. Elles invitent les différents intervenants de la filière à se conformer aux conditions établies ainsi qu'aux textes en vigueur régissant le secteur.
Le gouvernement appelle l'ensemble des acteurs à respecter les règles établies.

By CIVICUS
Sep 11 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the implications of the Philippines’ proposed anti-disinformation bill with Josalee Deinla, Secretary-General of the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers, a civil society organisation that defends civil liberties in the Philippines.

Josalee Deinla

The Philippines’ House of Representatives has approved the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act, which would criminalise the deliberate creation and spread of false information deemed to cause public harm or threaten national security. Its supporters describe it as a tool against disinformation and foreign interference, but civil society warns that vague definitions leave it open to being used to silence dissent. The bill now awaits Senate approval.

What’s the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act about, and why is it contested?

The proposed Digital Media Anti-False Information Act combines two regulatory approaches. The first targets the infrastructure of disinformation, including political advertising, recommender systems and the commercial systems that amplify and monetise content. Regulation of this infrastructure makes sense. Platforms decide what gets ranked and amplified, and their revenue depends on the engagement that attention-generating content produces.

The second approach is punitive, targeting individual speakers and operators. The law would make it unlawful to knowingly and wilfully publish, disseminate, finance, direct or materially assist in spreading false information with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth and with intent to cause verifiable public harm or a serious threat to national security. The penalty is set at six to 12 years in prison and a fine of up to PHP 2 million (approx. US$32,500).

The main problem is that the bill places its harshest burden at the end of the disinformation chain and its lightest at the point where disinformation is amplified and made profitable. Platforms face only administrative penalties and written warnings, while individual speakers face imprisonment and heavy fines.

If platform regulation, disclosure, correction, labelling and de-amplification can protect the public interest, the state must explain why individual speakers should face up to 12 years in prison. The law’s criminal provisions are hard to justify as necessary. Criminal law should be the last resort against expression, not the first.

The bill also relies on broad, overlapping definitions. ‘Disinformation’ requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, plus intent to cause serious public harm. ‘False information’ is broader still, encompassing any demonstrably false statement presented as fact, regardless of materiality or context. Because prohibited acts draw on both definitions, the accused is left guessing which applies to which charge.

The consequences could be worse still. Three other Senate bills are pending before the Committee on Public Information and Mass Media, including one that would authorise the Department of Justice’s Office of Cybercrime to issue access-blocking, rectification, takedown and preventive takedown orders. It targets content causing harm to individuals, public order or national interests, a far broader test than the requirement that harm be material and concrete.

Why is the bill being pushed now?

There’s a genuine disinformation problem in the Philippines. Elections now depend heavily on digital campaigning, particularly on social media, and coordinated influence operations, historical revisionism, paid influencers and troll networks have all become part of routine political competition. Concerns over foreign interference have added a national-security dimension to the debate.

But the political context is inseparable from the legislation. The bill’s authorship is revealing. It was promoted by Representative Ferdinand Alexander ‘Sandro’ Marcos III, a son of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Ironically, the same political dynasty now demanding tighter legal controls on disinformation used social media’s commercial architecture to return to power in 2022.

The state is not a neutral outsider arriving to repair a corrupted information environment. Political elites participate in that environment, using the same advertising systems, amplification mechanisms, consultants, influencers and platforms they now propose to regulate. A government that actively competes in the information marketplace should not also acquire broad and insufficiently constrained authority to referee the truth of that marketplace.

The imbalance is visible even within the bill. Section 16 requires government agencies to maintain open-data portals and correct erroneous or misleading public statements within a reasonable timeframe after discovery, but it creates no enforcement mechanism and no penalty for non-compliance. Section 9, by contrast, exposes individual speakers who violate the law to six to 12 years’ imprisonment. The bill treats disinformation by the state as a matter of administrative housekeeping, while disinformation by individual speakers can become a serious felony.

The timing therefore reflects two developments: a real deterioration of the information environment and a political effort to acquire greater control over the consequences of that deterioration.

What risks do its provisions pose for civil society?

Alongside prosecution and what comes with it – arrest, detention, legal costs, disrupted work and stigma – the law, if enacted, will change behaviour long before any court decides guilt. For civil society organisations, human rights defenders, journalists and researchers, the cost lies in the interval between accusation and acquittal. No conviction is needed for the law to produce silence.

The bill’s safeguards don’t answer the central problem. Most operate only as defences or rules of construction after investigation has already begun. They may ultimately prevail, but the chilling effect operates in the process that precedes that determination.

Section 4(d) also raises a serious problem. It applies to a person who acts ‘on behalf of, in coordination with, or under the substantial direction or control of’ a foreign state, foreign intelligence service, foreign military force or foreign-funded covert influence operation. This is dangerously broad. Philippine civil society groups, human rights defenders, independent media, lawyers and universities routinely communicate with foreign embassies, foreign universities, international donors, international organisations and United Nations (UN) treaty bodies and special procedures mandate holders. All these relationships are part of everyday international advocacy.

The problem becomes more acute if this bill is read alongside separate foreign interference and malign foreign influence legislation now pending in Congress, which would create a Counter Foreign Interference Council and penalise foreign interference. The impacts could be cumulative. An organisation may first be accused of disseminating false information, then characterised as coordinating with foreign interests, then subjected to scrutiny of its funding and institutional relationships. Together, these measures could allow the state to scrutinise what civil society says, who it works with, who supports it and how its information reaches the public.

This is why any law allowing the government to determine whether political information is false, harmful to public order, malicious or threatening to national security demands exceptional caution. Responding to disinformation can’t mean giving the government a mandate to police truth.

How is civil society responding, and what support does it need?

Civil society opposition has been substantial, but it must be sustained. On 25 July, around 50 academics, civil society representatives, journalists and technologists gathered at the University of the Philippines College of Media and Communication, while at least a dozen organisations issued a joint call urging Congress to reject the bill. Opposition to the bill can easily be caricatured as opposition to regulating disinformation, but this is a false choice.

Civil society acknowledges the harm of disinformation but contests where the law places responsibility for it. Disinformation in the Philippines rarely stems from individual users making bad choices online. Much of it is organised, financed and professionally produced. Political operatives retain consultants who assemble networks of paid influencers and account operators. Coordinated pages manufacture the appearance of organic public sentiment, while platforms supply the distribution systems through which these narratives gain scale. The individual user is often the last link in a much longer chain, and the law should follow that chain upward.

Civil society proposes that allocation of responsibility should begin with the political principal who commissions the operation, the financier who pays for it, the strategist who designs it, the network that carries it out and the platform that amplifies and profits from it. Users should not become the preferred target of enforcement simply because they are the easiest to find.

Civil society needs support at several levels. It needs lawyers who can intervene while the Senate text is still being shaped and, if necessary, mount constitutional challenges later. It also needs technical expertise capable of interrogating platform claims about advertising tools, algorithms, content moderation and recommendation systems, and resources to protect human rights defenders, journalists and researchers, who may face complaints, digital attacks, investigations, surveillance and red-tagging – being vilified as a communist – once the law is in force.

International support matters too. Philippine organisations that receive foreign grants, work with international media and research institutions or engage UN mechanisms should not have to defend those relationships as though they were inherently suspect. Cross-border cooperation and funding are routine features of academic research, election monitoring, human rights work and journalism, and should not be collapsed into the language of foreign interference.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Website
Facebook
LinkedIn
Twitter
Josalee Deinla/Facebook
Josalee Deinla/Twitter

SEE ALSO
Philippines: ‘Development should serve people’s needs, not foreign capital’s demands’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Cathleen de Guzman 13.Aug.2026
Philippines: Civil society demands accountability for the Negros 19 killings as targeting of activists and journalists persist CIVICUS Monitor 24.Jul.2026
Philippines: ‘Change doesn’t come all at once, but in accumulated milestones’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Reighn Claire Ochosa 16.May.2026

 

 

 

 

On 2 September 2026, UNICEF staff and partners are distributing recreation kits at Child-Friendly Spaces (CFS) at the holding center for children affected by the recent flash floods in Nuwakot District, Bagmati Province, Nepal. Credit: UNICEF/Laxmi Prasad Ngakhusi

By Shreya Komar
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 11 2026 (IPS)

Two weeks after devastating floods struck Nepal, communities across the country are still struggling to meet basic needs as humanitarian efforts continue. The disaster, triggered by a glacial collapse, has become one of Nepal’s deadliest in recent years, leaving widespread destruction in its wake.

As of Wednesday, 1,367 people had been confirmed dead, while 5,132 remained missing, including 587 foreign nationals. 13,646 people have been rescued, but many families are still waiting for news about their loved ones. Search operations remain ongoing, including efforts to reach people who may still be trapped in tunnels and other difficult-to-access areas.

The scale of the destruction has made delivering aid particularly challenging. Floodwaters have damaged homes, roads, bridges, and other essential infrastructure, leaving some communities isolated. The Nepalese government has been using military helicopters to drop aid into areas that remain difficult to reach, while temporary bridges are also being constructed to reconnect communities that have received insufficient assistance.

Families urgently need food, clean drinking water, shelter and access to healthcare. Health services are particularly important for vulnerable groups, including an estimated 1,600 pregnant women who are expected to give birth soon. Ensuring that these women can reach medical facilities and receive appropriate prenatal and emergency care is a major concern.

Mental health support is another pressing need that could become increasingly important as the immediate emergency begins to subside. Survivors have lost homes, livelihoods and, in many cases, family members.

On Wednesday September 9, UN Resident Coordinator for Nepal Lila Pieters Yahia, briefed reporters at UN Headquarters on the ongoing humanitarian efforts by the UN and the Nepalese government.

“People were just so depressed,” Yahia reflected after her visit to the affected communities.

Many people are also coping with the uncertainty of not knowing whether missing relatives are alive. Reuniting separated families and children has therefore become another important part of the humanitarian response.

The United Nations and its humanitarian partners launched a USD 49.6 million flash appeal last Friday to provide life-saving assistance to people affected by the disaster. The appeal is intended to support critical needs including food, clean water, logistics and other immediate relief. So far, approximately USD 22 million has been pledged, leaving a significant funding gap.

The Nepal Red Cross Society is leading much of the humanitarian response, with support from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations. Aid is being distributed through a combination of government agencies, community organizations and non-governmental organizations. However, humanitarian officials continue to warn that access remains one of the greatest obstacles to reaching people in need.

Yahia described the destruction as an example of the increasingly severe losses faced by countries vulnerable to climate change. “The devastation Nepal has experienced is an extraordinary, stark illustration of the losses and damages that climate-vulnerable countries are increasingly facing,” she said.

Nepal’s experience has also renewed calls for greater international action on climate change and climate justice. As a mountainous country particularly vulnerable to changing weather patterns and the effects of a warming climate, Nepal faces a disproportionate burden.

Despite the enormous challenges, Yahia says aid is reaching many affected communities, and survivors continue to demonstrate hope. “People are still searching for family members they know they may never find,” she said, highlighting the resilience keeping people strong. Yet thousands of people remain in need, and the destruction of transportation networks means that reaching the most isolated communities will take time.

“My plea tonight to the international community: we need to demonstrate solidarity with the people of Nepal,” Yahia emphasized.

For Nepal, the emergency is far from over. The immediate priority remains saving lives and providing food, water, shelter and access to healthcare. As communities begin the long process of rebuilding, the country will also need sustained international support to recover from one of its most destructive disasters.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Twenty-five years ago today, Islamist terrorists hijacked four US passenger aircraft and attacked key symbols of American power. Nearly 3,000 people died. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon triggered lasting changes in international security and foreign policy. Europe's press discusses the knock-on effects.

In the run-up to the Swedish general election on Sunday, the centre-left opposition comprising the Social Democrats, the Left Party, the Greens and the Centre Party is leading the polls, ahead of the centre-right coalition of Liberal Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Liberals, which cooperates with the right-wing Sweden Democrats (SD). However, both camps have been hit by new scandals shortly before the vote.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has raised its key interest rate from 2.25 to 2.5 percent. Officials said the decision was prompted by inflationary pressure caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Prices are being driven up primarily by the oil price shock resulting from the war in Iran. Commentators see little hope of the situation improving with this measure.