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La Commission devrait dévoiler son plan d'action le 19 mai

The post Crise des engrais : les ministres de l’Agriculture appellent à une action immédiate appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Emily and Simion Sawe share their pride at the runner's historic sub-two-hour marathon win.

Alors que la course à la succession en France approche à grands pas, le couple présidentiel entame ses adieux

The post Adieu, Élysée : les Macron réfléchissent à leur vie après la politique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Während sich in Frankreich das Rennen um die Nachfolge abzeichnet, beginnt das Präsidentenpaar Macron seinen Abschied.

La préférence européenne n'est pas inscrite dans l'appel d'offres, malgré le financement de l'UE

The post La nouvelle usine de bus chinois au Sénégal n’aura pas d’influence sur le contrat européen appeared first on Euractiv FR.

L'État de droit se dégrade dans plusieurs pays européens, dont la Croatie. Justice fragilisée, corruption persistante, pressions sur les médias et la société civile : le rapport annuel de l'ONG Liberties appelle Bruxelles à réagir.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Politique, Questions européennes, Croatie droitisation

L'État de droit se dégrade dans plusieurs pays européens, dont la Croatie. Justice fragilisée, corruption persistante, pressions sur les médias et la société civile : le rapport annuel de l'ONG Liberties appelle Bruxelles à réagir.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Politique, Questions européennes, Croatie droitisation

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Die direkte Beaufsichtigung von Anbietern von Krypto-Asset-Dienstleistungen ist ein zentraler Bestandteil der Bemühungen der EU-Exekutive, eine „Spar- und Investitionsunion“ zu schaffen.

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions. In a nutshell:
1. Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
2. Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
3. Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

 

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions. In a nutshell:
1. Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
2. Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
3. Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

 

Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions. In a nutshell:
1. Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
2. Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
3. Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.

 

Nikos Androulakis, chef du PASOK, principal parti socialiste d'opposition, et qui a été le premier à découvrir que son téléphone avait été mis sur écoute, a déclaré que cette décision « portait atteinte à l'autorité du pouvoir judiciaire et la sapait ».

The post La Cour suprême grecque sous le feu des critiques après avoir clôturé l’affaire des écoutes téléphoniques appeared first on Euractiv FR.

„Man kann nicht gleichzeitig Handelsabkommen und Maßnahmen zur Verwaltungsvereinfachung befürworten und gleichzeitig pro-europäische Maßnahmen zur Vereinheitlichung des Binnenmarkts ablehnen“, sagte der Kommissar.

Les allégations de détournement de 4,3 millions d'euros ont suscité un vif débat au Parlement

The post Fonds d’extrême droite : une plainte à l’Office européen de lutte antifraude met le Parlement sous pression appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les pays européens pourraient-ils rassembler suffisamment de forces politiques et militaires pour se défendre sans les États-Unis ?

Stéphane Séjourné explique à Euractiv qu'il existe un risque de blocage massif à un moment où l'UE a besoin de s'intégrer

The post INTERVIEW : Séjourné vise un grand compromis politique pour sortir de l’impasse du marché unique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, Apr 28 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Its corruption perception index (CPI) score, 24, is 18 points below the global average score of 42, and 21 points lower than the Asia-Pacific region’s average of 45. One of the main sources of corruption is over-priced aid-funded projects as they lack competitive bidding. Projects funded through Government-to-Government deals drive up costs by more than 400% compared to more transparent alternatives, and around 35% of project costs are lost to corruption and inefficiency.

Anis Chowdhury

These are well-researched and well-known facts. Yet development partners continue to advance loans (packaged as aid) to Bangladesh violating the United Nations Principles of Responsible Sovereign Lending.

Complicity

Development partners – traditional and non-traditional – cannot deny their complicity. The most culpable is the World Bank, followed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The shares of Bangladesh’s external debt liabilities to them are around 29%, 23% and 18%, respectively, totalling 70% of total external debt. Russia and China are Bangladesh’s main non-traditional development partners, with their respective shares of total external debt at 11% and 7%. All donors offered loans rampantly to the fascist regime to achieve their strategic and business interest, ignoring its extensive corruption and wide-spread human rights violations.

The World Bank briefly demonstrated its adherence to responsible lending principles when it cancelled $1.2 billion IDA credit for the Padma Bridge project in 2012, citing high-level corruption allegations. But its lending subsequently increased as if to expiate itself for the cancellation of the Padma Bridge loan. Mr. Hasan, one of the most corrupt ministers in the deposed Hasina Government, boasted, “once the World Bank cancelled its credit to finance Padma Bridge but now [in 2023] it has proposed to provide $2.25 billion”. To embarrass (or absolve?) the Bank, Sheikh Hasina presented a picture of the Padma Multipurpose Bridge to World Bank President David Malpass at the loan signing ceremony.

While Dhaka boasted that the Padma Bridge project was “entirely funded” by the government, China Exim Bank in fact provided $2.67 billion preferential buyer’s credit. The project costed approximately $3.6-$3.9 billion, nearly 3 times the initial estimate of $1.2 billion (the amount sought from the World Bank), largely due to corruption. The cost over-run triggered crises in both the forex and local currency markets, leading to the erosion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the lifeline at the dying hours of Hasina’s kleptocratic regime when it approved $4.7 billion in January 2023 with some vague conditionality, such as raising revenues, implementing structural reforms to create a conducive environment to expand trade and foreign direct investment, deepening the financial sector, and developing human capital.

The IMF chose to turn a blind eye to widespread corruption, including the looting of banks by the regime’s cronies, gross violations of human rights and election engineering to hold on to power. Can the IMF absolve itself of responsibility for enabling the survival of the collapsing repressive and corrupt regime to commit human rights violations and abuses during the mass uprising against it a year and half later?

Old habits die hard

Corruption in Bangladesh has deep roots; corruption’s tentacles have reached almost the entire body polity of the country to become a ‘social culture’. Nevertheless, the Interim Government, led by Nobel Laureate Professor Yunus, took some bold reform initiatives to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and the integrity of the financial sector.

Thus, it is deeply disappointing that the newly elected government replaced the highly professional central bank governor with a failed business person with no background in banking or international macroeconomics within the first week of assuming power. A loan defaulter himself, the new governor immediately relaxed the loan rules. The government also amended the Interim Government’s Bank Resolution Ordinance to allow the return of the restructured banks to previous owners who looted these banks.

These changes, together with the new government’s rejection of the Interim Government’s ordinances concerning the ACC, the independence of judiciary and the human rights commission, are clear signs of the old habits’ refusal to die and the persistence of corruption.

Another old habit, i.e., addiction to loans (so-called aid), denies to die. As of April 2026, the External Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance has been instructed to look for up to $3 billion from development partners. Interestingly, the ERD’s main activity is foreign fund searching through its ‘fund searching committee’ which meets periodically to review (code name for naming and shaming section chiefs) its monthly loan signing targets. Instead, the ERD should have been focusing on fostering and strengthening economic relations – trade and investment – as its name implies.

One direct damage of aid addiction is the lethargy in mobilising domestic resources – Bangladesh’s tax-GDP ratio (around 7%) is not only low compared with the averages for low-income countries (13.5%) and middle-income countries (18.9%), but has also been declining from its peak of around 9% in 2012 since its borrowing from development partners accelerated.

Of course, the other collateral damage is the persistence of corruption. IMF research finds that countries with “voracious” and “fractious” politics divert large amounts of public resources to unproductive transfers to powerful interest groups.

Development partners’ responsible roles

All development partners – multilateral and OECD DAC members – ostensibly are in favour of “good governance”, meaning against corruption. The World Bank “considers corruption a major obstacle… to promoting shared prosperity”. The IMF views corruption as “a major obstacle to economic growth, stability, and development”. The ADB “maintains a zero-tolerance stance against corruption, viewing it as a major obstacle to development, poverty reduction, and economic growth”.

Unfortunately, the evidence of their complicity presented above tells a different story from their avowed anti-corruption posture. This casts doubt on their role as development partners. Global evidence shows that donors do not systematically allocate aid to less corrupt countries.

The citizens of the country expect that development partners remain true to their declared anti-corruption stance and advance concessional loans provided the government commits to strict monitorable anti-corruption measures and deep structural reforms. In particular, urgently needed funds should be considered if:

• Ordinances of the Interim Government designed to strengthen anti-corruption measures, protect human rights and ensure judicial independence are ratified by the Parliament;
• amendments to the Bank Resolution Ordinance are repealed; and
• a professionally competent and experienced person with high integrity is appointed as central bank governor.

To achieve deep structural reform, the focus should be on strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation and reorientation away from the aid-dependent development model to a trade and investment led development model. Therefore, development partners should open up their markets, encourage investment in productive sectors and help develop Bangladesh’s productive capacity.

On the other hand, if they remain complicit and advance loans in a highly corruption-prone environment, any future pro-people government will have the right to declare such loans as “odious” and to refuse repayment obligation.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Die Kommission wird voraussichtlich am 19. Mai einen Düngemittel-Aktionsplan vorlegen, der Vorschläge zur Verringerung der Importabhängigkeit, zur Steigerung der heimischen Produktion und zur Dekarbonisierung des Sektors enthält.

Également dans l'édition de mardi : le vote du budget, de l'engrais, le web grec, l'AI Act

The post Qui a tué la directive ? appeared first on Euractiv FR.