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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2016

© nicanor-ngouan.net État de guerre, horreur absolue, urgence absolue, hyper ceci, hyper cela … Face aux terribles attentats ayant ensanglantés la France, la parole institutionnelle, dès Charlie Hebdo, a choisi de n’adresser que l’émotion, dans une sorte de surenchère performative. … Lire la suite →

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© mrallen / Fotolia

Challenges to security in Europe will take centre stage at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July when its heads of state and government will discuss issues ranging from Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its growing military assertiveness to turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, and the future of the military alliance.

This note highlights a selection of commentaries, studies and reports by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes on European security and defence published in the run-up to the NATO summit. More reports on the subject can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ from in November 2015.

NATO summit

NATO Summit 2016: From reassurance to deterrence. What’s really at stake?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2016

The Warsaw summit and the return of Western nationalism
Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2016

Warsaw summit
Atlantic Council, June 2016

NATO Summit 2016: NATO must reaffirm its “open door” policy
Heritage Foundation, June 2016

National priorities for the NATO Warsaw summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2016

NATO defence planning between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military challenges of a credible assurance against Russia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016

What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and beyond
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw summit: The challenges of adapting to strategic change
Danish Institute of International Studies, December 2015

Other studies

Restoring the power and purpose of the NATO alliance
Atlantic Council, June 2016

Time to restore conventional deterrence-by-denial
Egmont, June 2016

A new strategy: Implications for CSDP
Clingendael, June 2016

All not quiet on NATO’s eastern front
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

A threat-based strategy for NATO’s southern flank
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Activation of risk potential
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2016

The future of Transatlantic security
Rand, June 2016

Evaluating future U.S. Army force posture in Europe
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016

NATO must stop crowding Russia
Cato Institute, June 2016

European defence: From strategy to delivery
Clingendael, May 2016

Embedding NATO into the European Union Global Strategy: The missing link?
European, May 2016

Closing NATO’s Baltic gap
International Centre for Defence Studies, May 2016

Russia: A test for Transatlantic unity
Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund, May 2016

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security
European Policy Centre, May 2016

Russian “countermeasures” to NATO are coming
Brookings Institution, May 2016

EUISS yearbook of European security 2016
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Envisioning European defence: Five futures
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

For a “new realism” in European defense: The five key challenges an EU defense strategy should address
German Marshall Fund, April 2016

A new Helsinki needed? What security model for Europe?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2016

The parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation
Clingendael, April 2016

European defence spending 2015: The force awakens
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Do we need an EU army? Which way for the European security and defence cooperation
Mendel European Centre, March 2016

NATO’s guns point the wrong way
Friends of Europe, March 2016

NATO, the US and Baltic Sea security
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2016

The annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European security
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2016

Ensuring deterrence against Russia: The view from NATO’s front-line States
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2016

Forces terrestres et réassurance: Quelles options pour l’Alliance?
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2016

The defence of Europe before European Defence: Returning to the Schuman method
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2016

A stronger CSDP: Deepening defence cooperation
Clingendael, January 2016

Defence budgets and cooperation in Europe: Developments, trends and drivers
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Consortium of Think Tanks, January 2016

Reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the Baltics
Rand, January 2016

NATO and European security: back to the roots?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

The EU, Russia and the quest for a new European security bargain
Clingendael, December 2015

European strategy, European defence and the CSDP
Egmont, November 2015

L’Europe à la croisée des chemins: La politique de défense et de sécurité a besoin d’initiatives franco-allemandes
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015

Après avoir battu campagne pour la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne, l’ancien maire de Londres – qui n’a jamais hésité pour sa cause à faire usage de mensonges grotesques et à se rouler dans la plus vile des xénophobies … Lire la suite →

En « Europe », les électeurs anglais, si l’on peut d’abord saluer chez eux le respect du précieux principe démocratique, n’ont aucune idée de ce qui les attend (une récession et la réalisation brutale leur place exacte sur l’échiquier mondial) : l’une … Lire la suite →

L’idée a surgit, comme celles que l’on préfère oublier, après une sortie de table excessive. Prêts à tout pour montrer que la gauche de gouvernement n’était pas « angélique », après les attentats ayant ensanglantés Paris, des esprits échauffés, se croyant richement … Lire la suite →

Sur le papier, c’est bien. C’est juste un autre truc low-cost, une possibilité de prendre un TGV moins cher, avec un modèle calqué sur ces compagnies aériennes qui font un Paris-Milan à moins de 100 euros, aller-retour. On se doute … Lire la suite →

Une fois de plus, le Conseil constitutionnel s’est érigé, au Sénégal, en gouvernement des juges. Caporalisé. Après la grotesque décision validant la candidature d’Abdoulaye Wade pour un troisième mandat en 2012, avec le renfort tarifé de membres de la Sorbonne … Lire la suite →

« Le secret a été gardé jusqu’au bout. Rien n’a fuité », RFI, 16 février 2016. [rires] De l’employée de maison au riche commerçant, du vendeur de café touba au professeur d’Université, toute la société sénégalaise savait ce qu’allait dire Macky Sall, … Lire la suite →

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel, Stanislas de Finance, Ralf Drachenberg

This 25-26 June 2015 summit witnessed an intense debate. While the agenda originally covered Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the digital single market and the European Semester, in addition to a presentation from David Cameron, United Kingdom Prime Minister to outline his vision on renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU, the summit became a crisis Council. Many discussions again focused on the situation in the Mediterranean, with several lively exchanges. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel described the issue as the ‘biggest challenge’ Europe had faced during her time in office.

The Council’s conclusions nevertheless managed to address all issues on the agenda. The Heads of State or Government concentrated on three key dimensions of the European Commission’s agenda on migration: the relocation/resettlement of migrants; their return/readmission/reintegration; and cooperation with countries of both origin and transit. Clear differences in opinion persisted on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the relocation scheme, but agreement was reached on ‘the temporary and exceptional relocation, over two years, from the frontline Member States: Italy and Greece, to other Member States of 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection’.

Although the debate on CSDP fell short of its original ambition, the Council conclusions included a statement that the European Council ‘will keep security and defence policy on its regular agenda’, thereby clearly underlining the future importance of CSDP.

United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron’s presentation of his vision on renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, did not outline any specific details, however, it provided an impetus for European level discussions on this issue, with Council President Donald Tusk seeing it as ‘the first step in a longer process that will also end at the European Council’. This issue is certain to reappear on the agenda for the Council meeting in December 2015.

The significantly shortened debate on the Commission communication on a Digital Single Market strategy for Europe, nevertheless led to Council conclusions calling for the rapid adoption of the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, the Directive on Network and Information Security, and the Data Protection package. Heads of State or Government also stressed that action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, such as eliminating mobile roaming charges. On this issue, on 30 June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reached agreement to end roaming surcharges by 15 June 2017.

The EPRS publishes briefings on the European Council before summits, and European Council outcome briefings (next to be issued just after the European Council of 15-16 October 2015).

Read this Briefing on Outcome of the 25-26 June European Council in PDF

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu and Ralf Drachenberg

The June European Council has a comprehensive list of topics to discuss, including the situation in the Mediterranean, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), fighting terrorism, economic governance aspects, and the digital agenda. In addition, a presentation by the British Prime Minister on the future role of the United Kingdom is on the agenda.

Migration is the main topic of this June European Council. Heads of State or Government will discuss the recently published European Agenda for Migration and take stock of the progress made since the extraordinary European Council meeting on migration in April 2015. The European Council will discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a temporary relocation mechanism, which envisages relocating 40 000 persons from Italy and Greece to other Member States.

The European Council should also agree on a new CSDP roadmap and set the objectives for capabilities development, fostering the defence industry and the defence market, and strengthening relations with international organisations (i.e. the UN, NATO, the African Union). The Heads of State or Government will decide on a timeline for the completion of the strategic review process, most probably by June 2016. Within the broader context of discussing security aspects, the European Council will also examine the implementation of the informal February 2015 European Council‘s decisions on the fight against terrorism. 

During discussions on the 2015 European Semester the European Council endorse the Country Specific Recommendations that Member States should implement to ensure sound public finances and to make their economies more competitive. Whilst on the topic of better economic governance in the euro area, the ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ report is expected to be presented to the Heads of State or Government.

The European Commission’s recent Digital Single Market strategy for Europe will be tabled for examination, and the European Council will most likely call for a rapid adoption of pending legislation in this field, such as the European Single Market for Electronic Communications, the Directive on Network and Information Security and the proposal for a Regulation on Data Protection.

This European Council meeting will also hear United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron outline his vision for renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU.

Read the complete ‘Outlook for the European Council of 25 – 26 June 2015‘ in PDF.

Written by Marcin Grajewski

The recent interview by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he advocated ‘a joint EU army’ as a means to strengthen European foreign policy and ‘allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world’ has revived an on-going debate in think-tank and academic circles about how to maximise the effectiveness of existing national and Europe-wide efforts in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The European Council adopted an extensive set of conclusions on the subject in December 2013.

This note highlights a selection of recent studies, reports and commentaries by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes that analyse issues surrounding the development of CSDP.

Commentaries © TebNad / Shutterstock

Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army  European Policy Centre (EPC), March 12, 2015

Does the EU need its own army?  Carnegie Europe, March 11, 2015

The illusion of an independent EU army  Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2015

If not now, when? The Nordic EU battle-group

European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), February 17, 2015

The EU and the UN: together for peace

European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 18, 2014

Europe’s global power potential: locked in the EU28’s defence silos  Friends of Europe, December 4, 2014

2014: a centenary and a discovery  Egmont, December 2014

Analyses

The EU neighbourhood in shambles  Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 3, 2015

More Union in European defence  Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), February 26, 2015

European Defence Trends  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 6, 2015

Report: EU as a security provider  Clingendael, December 18, 2014

Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), December 15, 2014

Peacemaking: Can the EU meet expectations?  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December, 2014

Europe’s changing security landscape: What role will the EU play in security and defence?

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 12, 2014

Actors in the European defence policy area: roles and developments

Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 24, 2014

Constructing the defence dimension of the EU

International Security Information Service Europe, June, 2014

Security and defence: an issue for the European citizen?

Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), March, 2014

Livre blanc français de la défense 2013 : lignes de forces autour de la sécurité-défense européenne

L’Institut royal supérieur de défense, December, 2013

Why do Europeans need armed forces?  Fride, November, 2013

 Related publications

Why peacekeeping matters to Europe  Friends of Europe, March 11, 2015

The Wales pledge revisited: A preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO member states

European Leadership Network, February, 2015

In the belly of the beast: A European view on sending arms to Ukraine

Brookings Institution, February 4, 2015

Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2015: How others deal with disorder  Fride, January 12, 2015

A new European security order: The Ukraine crisis and the missing post-Cold War bargain

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, December 8, 2014

Integrating EU defence and migration policies in the Mediterranean  Fride, November, 2014

EP publication

The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy

European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), European Added Value Unit, June 2013

Read this At a glance on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in PDF

The European Union (EU) must not only promote the observance of human rights by other international actors, but also respect them itself in the course of all its actions abroad. However, the applicability of international human rights instruments to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations is problematic since the EU itself, as opposed to its Member States, is not party to these instruments. International human rights apply to EU-led missions as part of customary international law.

© EUFOR Tchad/RCA

These human rights obligations are enforced through specific accountability mechanisms. The EU is also responsible for human rights violations committed by private military and security services when fulfilling duties assigned by the EU.

The envisaged accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights raises questions as to the attribution of acts during CSDP operations to theMemberStates and EU. The European Court of Human Rights’ case law on the extra-territorial application of the Convention gives guidance as to its future relevance for EU missions abroad.

Click here for the whole briefing

© apfelweile / Fotolia.com6 language versions available in PDF format

Die maritimen Aspekte der GSVP der EU

La dimensión marítima de la PCSD de la UE

La dimension maritime de la PSDC

La dimensione marittima della PSDC dell’UE

Wymiar morski unijnej WPBiO

The maritime dimension of the EU’s CSDP

As piracy off Africa has become a global security issue, the need for the European Union (EU) to protect its interests at sea through a maritime dimension to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has also been recognised.

Importance of the sea for the EU

With a coastline of 70 000 kilometres and with 90% of its external trade transported by sea, the EU has vital maritime interests: security of global maritime flows, safety of maritime transport, fish, energy resources etc. Protecting the world’s maritime routes and lines of communication is an essential dimension of the EU’s security. The EU requires to develop an active approach to the varied challenges and threats to maritime security (terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, environmental degradation, depletion of marine resources etc.) in its neighbourhood and other zones.

EU’s role in maritime security

Although no EU maritime strategy as such exists, a maritime dimension has developed across EU policy areas and through EU agencies, e.g. fisheries, marine pollution, maritime transport, maritime surveillance, and energy security, as well as maritime power projection through CSDP. The Integrated Mari­time Policy for the EU (2007) aimed at uniting the various approaches, but its underlying economic rationale left little room for security issues. Equally, neither the European Security Strategy (2003) nor its Implementation Report (2008) directly addresses maritime security.

Despite some initiatives taken under the CSDP, there are still calls for a maritime dimension to CSDP strategy. In particular, the EU should actively seek to safeguard key trade routes (“Suez to Shanghai”, the Arctic) and prevent state or non-state actors from disrupting them.

The surge in African piracy prompted the launch in 2008 of the EU’s first CSDP naval operation, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, with the objective of combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and protecting UN food aid deliveries to the country. Two further CSDP missions (EUCAP Nestor – improving regional maritime capacities – and the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia – to train Somali security forces) – are part of a broader EU approach, based on the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (2011). Although Operation Atalanta enhanced the credibility of EU CSDP, the Somali case proves that a combination of threats (weak governance, piracy, illegal fishing, under-development) requires complex policies and tools.

Towards a Maritime Security Strategy

In this context, academics have called for an EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). This should take a holistic approach, integrating civil and military aspects, and state the EU’s maritime strategic objectives and the means to implement them, while avoiding duplication of capabilities at EU level. Cooperation with other maritime forces (NATO, the United States, China, Russia etc.) also needs to be tackled.

In 2010, EU Foreign Ministers launched the process of preparing “options for the possible elaboration of a security strategy for the global maritime domain.” The Commission and the European External Action Service are expected to present a formal proposal for the December 2013 European Council meeting, dedicated to CSDP matters.

European Parliament

The EP has adopted several resolutions addressing maritime security. The latest report on the Maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (rapporteur Ana Gomes, S&D, Portugal) states the importance of global maritime flows and calls for an EUMSS combining approaches to maritime safety and maritime security, and considering the “nexus between human security, state governance and human development”. It also stresses the need for improved exchange of information and intelligence on maritime risks and threats between EU Member States, and proposes the creation of EU coastguards.

Idén nyáron több német döntéshozó is Görögországba megy nyaralni. A politikusok az után döntöttek így, hogy megtudták, az országba 50 százalékkal kevesebb turista érkezik 2012-ben, mint az azt megelőző években – írja a Deutsche Welle.

A politikusok pusztán egyéni szolidaritásból utaznak a déli országba. A német döntéshozók a válság kirobbanása óta megszilárdult negatív előítéletek ellen is „fel szeretnék használni” nyaralásukat, szerintük a görögöknek látniuk kell azt, hogy a német politikusok a görög gazdaság fellendítése érdekében egyéni nyaralásaikkal is támogatni kívánják az országot, így sarkallva más német polgárokat is az utazásra.

Bár első pillantásra furcsának tűnhet a német politikusok kezdeményezése, mégis tény, hogy az idegenforgalom a harmadik legnagyobb társadalmi-gazdasági tevékenységi terület az EU-ban, becslések szerint ez a szektor az EU GDP-jének több mint 10%-át és az összes munkahely kb. 12%-át biztosítja, így a válságból való kilábalás egyik záloga lehet. A görög gazdaság talpra állításának is az egyik fontos eleme az odalátogató turisták számának növelése, azonban a görög politikai viharok, amelyek az utcákon is lecsapódtak, sok ezer turistát bizonytalanítottak el.

A német politikusok pont ez ellen kívánnak tenni, és szeretnének jó példát mutatni. Az egyik Görögországba készülő politikus azonban megjegyezte: „persze nem úgy fogok körbejárni a szigeteken, hogy azt hangoztatom, én egy német politikus vagyok”.

Négyévente az EU vezetői mindent elkövetnek annak érdekében, hogy uniós köntösbe bújtassák az olimpiai részvételt, és arra biztatnak, hogy az EU-tagállamok eredményeiket egységesen kezelve keljenek versenyre harmadik országokkal.

Az elmúlt olimpiák során is előszeretettel hangoztatták uniós vezetők a tagállamok által elért eredményeket. 2004-ben Romano Prodi a Bizottság akkori elnöke az EU- tagállamok által szerzett 82 aranyérmet közös uniós érdemnek nevezte. A 2008-as pekingi olimpia után Nicolas Sarkozy, az EU soros elnökségét betöltő Franciaország elnöke az ötkarikás játékok során megszerzett uniós előnyről beszélt.

Egy uniós brosúra a Europe: The Cradle of the Olympic Movement, a 2012-es Londoni Olimpiai Játékok előtt számba veszi az EU, vagy ha jobban tetszik az uniós tagállamok eddigi és várható eredményeit. Az összefoglaló megjegyzi, hogy Európa az olimpiák bölcsője és, hogy „az ötkarikás játék végre visszatér a hazájába”. Az eddig megrendezett 30 olimpia közül ez lesz a 24. amelyet az EU 27 tagállamának egyikében rendeznek meg.

Nile Gardiner, a The Telegraph publicistája a témában írt véleményrovatában kifejti: az uniós vezetők hajlamosak elfeledkezni arról, hogy a sportesemények inkább szólnak az egyéni és a nemzeti teljesítményekről, mint egy egységes „európai állam” eszményéről.

Európa és az unió számára rendkívül sok pozitív, főleg gazdasági hozadéka van egy, az öreg kontinensen megrendezett olimpiának, azonban az semmiképpen sem állítható, hogy ez lenne az az esemény, amely teret ad az uniós összetartozás érzésének. Az EU tájékoztató füzet szerint mindenesetre 108 érmet szerezne az a csapat, amely egységesen képviselné az Európai Uniót.

Egy friss Eurobarometer kutatásból kiderül, hogy az uniós polgárok féltik a személyes adataikat, és nem bíznak az online fizetési műveletekben. Ez a fajta bizonytalanság nem tesz jót az uniós gazdaságnak, ugyanis gátolja a nemzeti és határon átnyúló online vásárlások elterjedését.

Az online vásárlások a teljes uniós kiskereskedelmi forgalomnak mintegy 3%-át teszik ki, azonban a fogyasztói bizalmatlanság miatt csak nagyon lassan növekszik ez az ágazat. A Bizottság adatai szerint, ha például a fogyasztók bátrabban választanák a határon átnyúló internetes szolgáltatások adta lehetőségeket, akár 204 milliárd eurós összeget is megtakaríthatnának. Továbbá az internetes gazdaság minden megszüntetett nem internetes állás helyett 2,6 új online állást hoz létre.

Az Eurobarometer-felmérés szerint az internethasználók rendkívül aggályosnak ítélik a kiberbiztonság helyzetét: a válaszadók 89 százaléka tartózkodik a személyes adatok interneten történő közlésétől, 74%-uk véleménye szerint pedig az elmúlt évben megnőtt az esélye annak, hogy számítástechnikai bűnözés áldozatává váljanak. A netezők 29 százaléka nem mer az interneten online banki műveletet végezni vagy vásárolni. Persze az internetezők sem védik megfelelően adataikat, a felmérés arra is rámutat, hogy 53 százalékuk egyetlen online jelszavát sem változtatta meg az elmúlt évek során.

Magyarországon az uniós átlaghoz képest valamelyest rosszabb a helyzet, a magyarok csak 22 százaléka vásárol a neten – az uniós átlag 53 százalék – valamint csak 19 százalékuk fizet az internet segítségével, az uniós 48 százalékkal szemben.

A Bizottság a fogyasztói bizalom megteremtése érdekében már több kampányt is indított, azonban az EU továbbra is nagy lemaradásban van az IKT-szektorban, az uniós polgárok nem tudják kihasználni az internet adta lehetőségeiket. Az internethasználók tájékozatlansága pedig oda vezetett, hogy 12 százalékuk volt már online csalás szenvedő alanya, míg 8 százalékuk személyazonosság-lopás áldozatául esett.

A válság időszakában az EU nem engedheti, hogy ez a jövedelmező ágazat ilyen hátrányba kerüljön az unión belül, ezért a Bizottság 2015-ig megduplázná az internetes vásárlások számát.  Ezt azonban nehéz lesz megvalósítania a fogyasztói bizalom javítása nélkül, amelyben már a tagállamok felelőssége is igen nagy.