Selon l'autorité de régulation de la protection de la vie privée, l'ICO, laisser les utilisateurs déclarer eux-mêmes leur âge n'est pas efficace pour empêcher les enfants d'accéder à des contenus inappropriés.
The post L’autorité de surveillance britannique met en garde les géants des réseaux sociaux contre la mise en place de contrôles d’âge appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Alors que les tensions s’intensifiaient au Moyen-Orient en fin de mois de février 2026, faisant trembler les détroits stratégiques, une révolution s’est produite dans la […]
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The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.
The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.
The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.